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SHOULD THE IRS NEVER “TARGET”
TAXPAYERS? AN EXAMINATION OF THE IRS
TEA PARTY AFFAIR
Philip Hackney*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2012 and 2013, many congressmen and Tea Party organizations
accused the Internal Revenue Service (“Service”) of “targeting” the Tea
Party and other conservative political organizations.1 The Treasury
Inspector General for Tax Administration (“IG”) issued a report in 2013
that leant some credence to this claim.2 The IG report faulted the Service
for its method of screening applications for exemption from income tax.3
While the IG did not use the term target, it stated broadly that “[u]sing
the names or policy positions of organizations is not an appropriate basis
for [the Service to identify] applications for review by the team of
James E. and Betty M. Phillips Associate Professor of Law at the Louisiana State
University Law Center (formerly Senior Technician Reviewer in the Exempt Organizations
Branch of the Office of the Chief Counsel of the IRS from August 2006 through April 2011,
but did not work on any of the “Tea Party Cases”), J.D. LSU Law Center, B.A. Southern
Methodist University, LL.M. in Taxation NYU School of Law. I thank Ellen P. Aprill, Bryan
T. Camp, Michael Coenen, William F. Funk, Linda Jellum, Leandra Lederman, Lloyd
Mayer, Shu Yi Oei, James Puckett, Edward Richards, and Donald Tobin for their comments
and/or discussions regarding this Article. I also thank the 2014 SEALs Tax Discussion
group and the Stetson Law School Faculty Workshop. A big thank you to my research
assistants Jeff Butler and Jena Kyle, and the LSU Law Library staff in helping me make this
Article stronger than it otherwise would have been. I also thank Valparaiso University
Law School and its Law Review for hosting a wonderful symposium. Finally, a huge thank
you to my wife, Jill Coury Hackney, and my sons for putting up with me through all those
long hours while I wrote away on this and other articles. You guys mean the world to me.
This piece is a part of the Valparaiso University Law School’s 2014 Symposium, titled
“Money in Politics: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly.” For more pieces from the
symposium, see Valparaiso University Law School Symposium: Money in Politics: The Good, the
Bad, and the Ugly, 49 VAL. U. L. REV. (2015).
1
See
generally
TAXPROFBLOG,
http://taxprof.typepad.com/,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/PPR3-AL5L (providing editor Paul Caron’s best collection of all the
stories regarding this Tea Party matter). For instance, see Paul Caron, House Demands IRS
Documents on Alleging Harassment of Tea Party Groups, TAXPROFBLOG (Apr. 12, 2012),
http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2012/04/house-demands-irs-.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/QNC7-JTLU, for the stories discussing congressmen and Tea Party
groups alleging in 2012 that they were being targeted. See Paul Caron, The IRS Scandal,
Days 1-100, TAXPROFBLOG (Oct. 1, 2014), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/
2014/10/the-irs-scandal-days-1-100.html, archived at http://perma.cc/M8CG-JM3T, for a
collection of materials from 2013.
2
Treas. Inspector Gen. for Tax Admin., Inappropriate Criteria Were Used to Identify TaxExempt Applications for Review, Ref. No. 2013-10-053, 7 (May 14, 2013) [hereinafter IG
Report].
3
Id. at 5.
*
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specialists.”4 This Article seeks to determine whether any legal theories
or ethical claims support this IG criticism. It also seeks to determine if
the Service acted inappropriately in this case. This review finds with
respect to the first issue that the IG criticism was too sweeping. The
Service may generally use names to screen applicants to achieve certain
policy goals such as uniformity of the law or to focus on taxpayers that
may be in violation of the Internal Revenue Code (“Code”). It should
exercise its discretion with greater care though where the Code provision
it is enforcing impinges on a fundamental constitutional right.5 On the
second issue, this Article concludes that the Service had policy interests
of both uniformity and potential violations of the Code when it utilized
names in the Tea Party cases. Its actions thus fell within the scope of its
discretionary authority. However, best practices would call for greater
care from the Service when it is enforcing provisions that impact
fundamental Constitutional rights.
Little positive law exists to guide bureaucrats in exercising
discretionary authority.6 This Article therefore looks to a number of
disparate sources of law and professional guidance to try to identify
legal and ethical norms that might apply to Service employees when
choosing organizations to scrutinize. The review demonstrates that
courts and Congress provide the Service and agencies wide latitude in
exercising its investigatory and enforcement functions. For instance, the
Supreme Court set a high standard for establishing a claim for selective
enforcement. It has stated “the conscious exercise of some selectivity in
enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation . . . ,” there
must be a showing that “the selection was deliberately based upon an
unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary
classification.”7 Congress provides significant bureaucratic discretion to
the Service in its revenue collecting function through the Anti-injunction

Id. at 7; see, e.g., Second Amended Complaint, Linchpins of Liberty v. United States,
No. 13-777 (Oct. 23, 2014) (providing the complaint against federal officials for targeting
conservative groups for review of tax exemption).
5
See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962) (determining that selective enforcement is
not unconstitutional); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 2663, 2664 (2005) (discussing how reviewing courts and the Executive Branch should
carefully handle constitutionally sensitive interests).
6
See, e.g., KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 3
(1969) (stating that the author’s main focus is on how “to minimize injustice from exercise
of discretionary power”); Martin Shapiro, Administrative Discretion: The Next Stage, 92 YALE
L.J. 1487, 1487 (1983) (providing a discussion of the lack of control over administrative
agencies’ autonomy).
7
Oyler, 368 U.S. at 456.
4
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Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act.8 These judicial and legislative
choices demonstrate a US democratic determination that greater justice
is served by allowing the Service significant discretion in its choice in
how to enforce the law within its jurisdiction.9
Although much has been written about the question of how to
maximize tax enforcement with limited resources, there has been a
tendency to ignore administrative law issues in the field of tax.10 While
tax scholars are now turning in earnest to consider the implications of
administrative law on the administration of the Code, little has been
written about any legal limitations on the Service’s selection of persons
and entities for examination generally.11 Even less scholarship addresses
the limitations on managing the Service’s exempt organizations
applications process.12 This Article tries to fill that gap.
Cf. Kristin Hickman, Administering the Tax System We Have, 63 DUKE L.J. 1717, 1760
(2014) (suggesting that because the Service is often not collecting revenue, Congress should
revisit its vast grant of injunctive protection to the Service).
9
See infra Part III (discussing how the Court has shown a demonstrated commitment
that an agency’s choice not to enforce is generally beyond review of a court).
10
See, e.g., Amandeep S. Grewal, Foreword, Taking Administrative Law to Tax, 63 DUKE L. J.
1625, 1625 (2014) (commenting that tax law was isolated from administrative law for
decades). For a discussion of efforts to maximize tax enforcement with limited resources,
see Leigh Osofsky, Concentrated Enforcement, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 325 (2014).
11
See, e.g., Grewal, supra note 10, at 1625 (exploring how tax practice may be shaped by
administrative law doctrines). But see Joseph J. Thorndike, Reforming the Internal Revenue
Service: A Comparative History, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 717, 718–19 (2001) (exploring the history
of four efforts to reform the Service largely brought about because of frustration regarding
a belief that the Service agents were abusively investigating taxpayers); Bryan T. Camp,
Theory and Practice in Tax Administration, 29 VA. TAX REV. 227, 246, 259 (2009) [hereinafter
Theory and Practice in Tax Administration] (considering the positive and negative impact of
automated data processing on audits and also the importance of perceived procedural
justice on taxpayer compliance); see also Lawrence Zelenak, Should Courts Require the
Internal Revenue Service to be Consistent?, 40 TAX L. REV. 411, 411–12 (1985) (examining the
administrative duty of consistency); Steve R. Johnson, An IRS Duty of Consistency: The
Failure of Common Law Making and a Proposed Legislative Solution, 77 TENN. L. REV. 563, 563–
64 (2009) [hereinafter An IRS Duty of Consistency] (proposing an amendment to the Code as
a solution to the consistency dilemma); Christopher M. Pietruszkiewicz, Does the Internal
Revenue Service Have a Duty to Treat Similarly Situated Taxpayers Similarly?, 74 U. CINN. L.
REV. 531, 532–35 (2005) (discussing the IRS’ duty of consistency as applied in several court
cases). Also, more recently, a number of scholars have begun to consider the Service’s
choice not to enforce in general. For instance, see Leigh Osofsky, The Case for Categorical
Nonenforcement, 69 TAX L. REV. (forthcoming 2015).
12
However, after the Tea Party matter, several authors have analyzed some factors that
might have led to the problem. See Lily Kahng, The IRS Tea Party Controversy and
Administrative Discretion, 99 CORN. L. REV. ONLINE 41, 41, 51 (2013) (considering various
controls that could be improved upon by the Service in carrying out its administrative
discretion in managing its EO determinations program); Donald B. Tobin, The 2013 IRS
Crisis: Where Do We Go from Here?, TAX ANALYSTS 1120, 1120 (2014) (recommending clearer
regulations defining the boundaries of political activities for social welfare organizations,
8
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Kenneth C. Davis speaks of the “discretionary justice that is beyond
the reach of both judicial review and trial-type hearings,” in his classic
title Discretionary Justice.13 By discretion, Professor Davis means a public
officer’s “discretion whenever the effective limits on his power leave him
free to make a choice among possible courses of action or inaction.”14
Importantly, this space includes many acts of a public officer that are not
specifically directed by positive law. The question of how an agency
should fairly choose organizations to review with greater rigor typically
lies in this discretionary space that is generally, although not completely,
beyond the reach of judicial review. The scope of this discretion in the
case of the Service in its investigatory stage is especially large given the
inquisitorial nature of tax administration, where the regulatory agency is
charged with identifying taxpayers who are subject to tax.15
To put this question into concrete context, consider a couple of
hypotheticals. Assume that instead of looking at organizations to
determine if they were engaged in too much political campaign activity,
the Service was reviewing the applications of charities engaged in
bilking the parents of disabled children. Assume further that the name
of the charities identified were either “Acme Charity, Inc.” or “Acme
Foundation, Inc.” Assume agents identified four of these charities with
these two different names applying for exemption, and also on
examination, noticed that the Service had accidentally granted two
others exempt status. Under these circumstances, we should expect the
Service would search its computer system to identify any other “Acme
Charity, Inc.” or “Acme Foundation, Inc.” in its applications system.
Doing anything less would probably be malpractice on the part of the
Service. However, with this approach, the Service would be using
names for screening purposes in the determinations process. Yet, this
process would not be problematic at all, legally or ethically. Why should
it be any different in the case of examining whether organizations that
might be engaged in too much political campaign intervention?

but arguing that the better solution is to pass broad based campaign finance disclosure
laws removing the necessity of the Service to make decisions on political activities of
exempt organizations); George K. Yin, Saving the IRS, 100 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 22, 23 (2014)
(arguing that we should increase the transparency of the EO determinations function by
requiring the public disclosure of more determinations-related documents such as the
application of exempt organizations).
13
DAVIS, supra note 6, at 4.
14
Id.
15
See Bryan T. Camp, Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process and the Partial Paradigm
Shift in the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 56 FLA. LAW REV. 1, 19–20 (2004)
(describing tax administration as inquisitorial).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol49/iss2/9

Hackney: Should the IRS Never "Target" Taxpayers? An Examination of the I

2015]

An Examination of the IRS Tea Party Affair

457

A slightly different hypo is important as well. In this one, assume
again that the Service happens to notice ten applications from
organizations all named New Charity, Inc. Assume further that these
organizations are engaging in a relatively new activity, and that the
Service is not certain how the tax-exempt law will impact this new
activity. If the Service directed its agents to send all of these applications
to one agent or one group of agents to make certain the applications are
worked in a uniform manner, we would think this a good use of limited
resources as well. Yet again, the pulling of the applications would be
based on name alone. Agents would screen for any New Charity, Inc.
application without any indication that there might be a violation of the
Code. This is also closely akin to the Tea Party cases, and yet fully
unobjectionable. These two hypotheticals work to show that there is a
common sense notion that the Service should be able to use names in
screening applications for exemption.
That leaves us with the second question—was the IG correct to
criticize the Service for utilizing names to screen in this particular case?
There is no law that tells the Service how it must review applications
from organizations seeking to be recognized as exempt from income tax.
The Service followed its own procedures that apply to its operation of its
application system.16 Thus, there is no sub-constitutional law that
demonstrates the Service violated the law by screening applications
when it utilized the Tea Party-related names.
Furthermore, the
predominant way to establish a legal violation in this instance would be
to establish that the Service violated equal protection principles by
engaging in selective enforcement. But generally, that is only shown
where the Service both selected and enforced the law that impacted a
constitutional right against one group and not against others. The
evidence suggests that the Service selected and enforced the law against
many other groups.17 Thus, the IG cannot point to a particular legal
violation by the Service. However, from an ethical standpoint, the
bureaucrats of the agency have a higher standard of care when utilizing
screening techniques when the law enforced implicates a constitutional
right. Here, the Service bureaucrats did not act with adequate care in
utilizing names in this case, which arguably involved the fundamental
constitutional right to speak.
This Article recognizes that the IG fulfills a special role that is
different than a role filled by courts in reviewing agency action or
See IG Report, supra note 2, at 5 (outlining the Service’s procedures in making the
determinations).
17
See id. at 8 (providing a breakdown of the potential political cases, including
organizations with Tea Party, 9/12, or Patriots in the name).
16
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Congress in passing legislation. However, this Article concludes that the
IG can do real harm to Service function when it fails to be more precise
in its criticism.18 The IG should have done more to identify the legal or
ethical basis upon which it bases its criticism. That would have gone a
long way to narrowing the basis of criticism in this case.
Part II of this Article details the Service determination and
examination processes.19 The determination process is the application
system the Service was administering when it reviewed the Tea Party
applications.20 The examination process is the process of auditing
taxpayers.21 These are both relevant to the Tea Party story to understand
the challenges the Service faces in administering and enforcing the Code.
Part III describes the law under the Code applicable to social welfare
organizations, the primary organization involved in the Tea Party
matter.22 It is important in the sense that it establishes the predicate that
the Service had good reason to review applications by Tea Party
organizations with greater scrutiny than other applications. Part IV
reviews legal and ethical principles that should apply to the Service
when it reviews applications for tax-exemption.23 While this Article
concludes that the use of names to screen applications is allowed, and
necessary, and it finds that when the Service is enforcing a provision that
impacts constitutional rights, the Service has a duty to act with a high
degree of care.24 Part V applies these principles to the Tea Party matter.25
The analysis finds that the Service did not violate any legal rules, but
should have acted with greater care in the use of screening techniques
because the particular Code section involved implicated important
constitutional rights to freedom of speech and association.26 Finally, Part
VI concludes that the Service did not engage in a legal violation, but

18
See infra Part V.B (providing recommendations to avoid a similar situation in the
future).
19
See infra Part II (detailing the Service’s processes used to target conservative
organizations).
20
See infra Part II.A (explaining the determination process).
21
See infra Part II.B (discussing the examination process).
22
See infra Part III (providing a discussion of the legal requirements for social welfare
organizations under the Code).
23
See infra Part IV (reviewing legal and ethical principles as a possible legal basis for
finding an issue with the determinations process).
24
See infra Part V.B (recommending that the Service act with a higher standard of care
when reviewing applications for exemption).
25
See infra Part V (applying the analysis to the Tea Party situation).
26
See infra Part V.B (arguing that a higher standard of care must be exercised by the
Service when Constitutional rights are implicated).
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rather mismanaged the application process and failed to meet an ethical
standard.27
II. SERVICE EXEMPT ORGANIZATION APPLICATION SYSTEM AND
EXAMINATION FUNCTION
This Part first discusses the exempt organization application system
the IG criticized and then considers the examination system. The exempt
organizations division of the Service (“EO”) reviews applications from
nonprofit organizations seeking to be recognized as exempt from income
tax in a process called the determinations process (“EO determinations
process”).28 The Service receives a high volume of paper applications
annually, more than the Service apparently has the capacity to handle.29
The Taxpayer Advocate listed as one of the most serious problems in
2012 as the overextension of Service resources in the EO determinations
process.30 Thus, the Service must make administrative and enforcement
choices in managing the EO determinations process given its scarce
resources. Because the Service faces a very similar scarce resource
challenge in its examinations process, this Part also reviews the related
methods the Service has chosen to manage its examination process.
A. Determinations Process
A determination in EO refers to the process of reviewing an
application from a nonprofit organization.31 These organizations file an
application with the Service to be recognized as tax exempt under

27
See infra Part VI (concluding that the Service did not meet ethical standards when it
targeted the Tea Party and other conservative political organizations).
28
See generally 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (describing the list of tax exempt organizations); 26
U.S.C. § 501(a) (creating a tax exemption for organizations recognized as exempt).
29
The Service’s recent adoption of the new Form 1023EZ appears to be changing this
problem. The Service has recently moved through a significant backlog of exemption
applications. Progress Update on Form 1023-EZ, IRS (Mar. 11, 2015), http://www.irs.gov/
portal/site/irspup/menuitem.143f806b5568dcd501db6ba54251a0a0/?vgnextoid=44beb23f
06ffb410VgnVCM1000003b4d0a0aRCRD, archived at http://perma.cc/VMC5-86LL.
30
See NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2012 Annual Report to Congress, 196–97, available at
http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/userfiles/file/Full-Report/Volume-1.pdf, archived
at http://perma.cc/SRX7-UEHU (discussing overextension of Service resources as a
problem in 2012); Identification of EO Technical Cases, IRM 7.20.1.4 (Dec. 20, 2012),
available
at
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part7/irm_07-020-001.html,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/WQE2-VXTL (showing an overview of determination letters for exempt
organizations).
31
See, e.g., Overview, IRM 7.20.1.1 (Dec. 20, 2012), http://www.irs.gov/irm/part7/
irm_07-020-001.html, archived at http://perma.cc/WQE2-VXTL (explaining determinations
letters for exempt organizations).
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section 501(a) because described in section 501(c) of the Code.32 A
determination is a private letter ruling issued by the Service to a
taxpayer that is only applicable to that taxpayer.33 No congressional
statute or rule requires the Service to make these private rulings on an
organization’s exempt status, and no rule requires the Service to provide
such rulings in the case of social welfare organizations. However, the
Service has long accepted requests from taxpayers for a letter assuring
the organization that the organization will be considered tax-exempt.
Congress has effectively approved and adopted the application system
of the Service with respect to charitable organizations that seek status
under section 501(c)(3).34
1.

Very Brief History of the Determinations Process

Dating back to the income tax of the Civil War, the Service has
required nonprofit applicants to prove their charitable status to claim
exempt status.35 With the enactment of the 1913 Income Tax, the Service
enacted regulations to require that nonprofit organizations prove
entitlement to exempt status.36 Under the initial system, an organization
seeking exempt status had to provide evidence to employees of the
Service, called local collectors, that the organization was entitled to
exempt treatment.37 Tax regulations issued under the 1917 and 1921 Tax
Act allowed any nonprofit organization seeking to avoid paying
corporate income tax to file an affidavit with the collector in the district
that the organization was located, setting forth the facts upon which the
organization based its request for an exemption.38
A collector had authority to make a determination on exemption
unless the collector was in doubt.39 Thus, in the early years, the exempt
determination was made in local field offices of the Service. Collectors
26 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2012).
See Rev. Proc. 2014-1, 2014-1 I.R.B. 7 (Jan. 2, 2014), available at http://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-irbs/irb14-01.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/KKU9-64NL (setting out the
definition of a letter ruling).
34
See 26 U.S.C. § 508(a) (requiring organizations seeking to be recognized as charitable
organizations to file a Notice with the Secretary of the Treasury).
35
See Internal Revenue Act of 1864, 13 Stat. 223, 279 (1866) (explaining an amendment
exempted from tax “managers of any . . . charitable, benevolent, or religious association”
upon proof to the local collector of taxation that the profits would be applied to the “relief
of sick and wounded soldiers, or to some other charitable use”).
36
T.D. 2693, 1918-1, C.B. 293; T.D. 3587, 1924-1, C.B. 247, 1924 WL 59031.
37
Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, section 111, 13 Stat. 279.
38
See Treas. Reg. § 231, art. 511 (1922), available at http://www.constitution.org/tax/usic/regs/Regs_45_revised_for_1918_act.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/FV38-VGDW
(discussing proof of exemption).
39
Id.
32
33
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were instructed to keep a list of organizations exempted from the
corporate income tax and to occasionally inquire into whether these
organizations continued to qualify for exemption.40
The Service appears to have changed its affidavit system into a
private letter ruling system in the 1940s.41 To claim an exemption, a
taxpayer had to request a private ruling from the Service.42 Before 1954,
all of these applications for private rulings were directed to the national
office in Washington, DC instead of to local field employees like the
original system.43 While in that year, the Commissioner provided
authority in Revenue Ruling 54-164 to the District Directors to issue
exemption letters in the field, it was not until fifteen years later that the
directors began to develop expertise in this area.44
The modern EO determinations system, described in more detail
below, got its start in 1969 with the enactment of section 508 of the Code.
That section requires charitable organizations to provide notice to the
Service to be recognized as exempt from tax.45 While there are a number
of other exempt organizations, such as voluntary employee benefit
associations and certain trusts that are specifically required to provide a
notice to the Service to be recognized as exempt, most organizations
need not provide such a notice.46
Id.
See David Ginsburg et al., Federal Oversight of Private Philanthropy, THE COMM’N ON
PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUB. NEEDS, RESEARCH PAPERS, VOL. 5, 2585 (1977),
https://archives.iupui.edu/handle/2450/812, archived at http://perma.cc/5AR-HEPV
(reviewing the history of exempt organizations); see also Rev. Proc. 59-31, 1959-2 C.B. 949
(discussing the Service’s private letter ruling system); Mortimer M. Caplin, Taxpayer
Rulings Policy of the Internal Revenue Service: A Statement of Principles, NYU 20TH INST. ON
FED. TAX 1–6 (1962) (detailing the history of the Service’s private letter ruling system from
the enactment of the 1913 income tax to 1962).
42
See Ginsburg et al., supra note 41, at 2583 (discussing the history of exempt
organizations); see also Rev. Proc. 59-31, 1959-2 C.B. 949 (discussing the Service’s private
letter ruling system).
43
See Ginsburg et al., supra note 41, at 2584 (discussing the history of exempt
organizations).
44
See Rev. Rul. 54-164, 1954-1 C.B. 88 (noting the Commissioner’s thoughts); Ginsburg et
al., supra note 41, at 2584 (discussing the number of years it took for directors to implement
expertise training).
45
See Tax Reform Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 91-172, Title I, § 101(a), 83 Stat. 494 (1969)
(analyzing the notice required that needs to be given to the IRS for charitable
organizations).
46
FRANCES R. HILL & DOUGLAS M. MANCINO, TAXATION OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS,
32.03 (2012); I.R.S. Serv. Center Advice 200046038, at 4 (Sept. 27, 2000),
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/0046038.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/; e.g.,
Overview, IRM 7.25.1.1 (Sept. 26, 2014), http://www.irs.gov/irm/part7/irm_07-025001.html, archived at http://perma.cc/XPR4-42AS. The overview provides that:
Except for most organizations described in paragraphs (3), (9), or (17)
of section 501(c), the Internal Revenue Code does not require
40
41
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Practically, even before the change in statutory requirement to file,
many charitable organizations filed notices with the Service in order to
be listed in Treasury Publication 78.47 This is a list kept by the Service
that provides notice that it recognizes a particular organization as
exempt from income tax.48 A donor that contributes to an organization
listed in Publication 78 can be assured that the Service will treat the
contribution as a charitable contribution deductible under section 170.49
There are many other benefits to a charitable organization that files an
application with the Service to be recognized as exempt.50 The benefits
to a noncharitable organization, however, such as a social welfare
organization, are lesser. The primary benefit is certainty of tax treatment
and general greater ease of dealing with the Service.
2.

Current Determinations Process

This Section describes the procedures the Service operates under to
conduct the EO determinations process. This is a description of the
determinations process as it existed immediately before the Service made
changes as a result of the Tea Party affair. It discusses the procedural
guidance to demonstrate the effort the Service has made to confine the
procedural discretion of its agents. Notably, this Section demonstrates
that rather than ignoring its procedures, the Service appears to have
followed its procedures in utilizing names to screen applications in the
Tea Party matter.
Part seven of the Internal Revenue Manual (“IRM”) publicly
describes the Tax Exempt Government Entities (“TEGE”) internal
organizations to apply for recognition of exemption. An organization
qualifies for exemption if it meets the requirements of the Code.
However, an organization is subject to tax until it establishes that it
qualifies for exemption, and most organizations find that filing an
application for recognition of exemption is the least burdensome way
to establish that they qualify.
Id.
See Cumulative List, IRM 25.7.6 (Oct. 31, 2014), http://www.irs.gov/irm/part25/
irm_25-007-006.html, archived at http://perma.cc/RC2E-QFUA (providing specifications
for organizations to be included in Publication 78, which lists organizations that may
receive tax deductible contributions).
48
See Search for Charities, I.R.S., available at http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-NonProfits/Search-for-Charities, archived at http://perma.cc/57ZF-QPU9 (providing a search
engine for a cumulative list of charitable organizations since Publication 78 is no longer
published).
49
Id.
50
See, e.g., Bazil Facchina, Evan Showell, & Jan E. Stone, Topics in Philanthropy: Privileges
& Exemptions Enjoyed by Nonprofit Organizations: A Catalog and Some Thoughts on Nonprofit
Policymaking (1993) (cataloging benefits of nonprofit organizations qualified as exempt
from federal income tax).
47
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procedures for issuing certain rulings and agreements to employee plans
and exempt organizations. Other useful documents in understanding
the determinations process as it existed include Revenue Procedure 20129, Publication 557 Tax-Exempt Status for Your Nonprofit Organization,
and the annual EO Work Plan.51
Any nonprofit organization that wants to be recognized by the
Service as exempt from federal income tax under section 501(a) of the
Code because described in section 501(c) of the Code may apply to the
EO Determinations function headquartered in Cincinnati, Ohio.52 The
employees in Cincinnati are considered to be working in a field office
rather than a national office.53 As will be seen though, the national office
provides oversight and guidance to that field office. Charitable
organizations seeking recognition under section 501(c)(3) generally must
Other nonprofit
file a Form 1023 to seek tax-exempt status.54
organizations, such as social welfare organizations under section
501(c)(4) and business leagues under section 501(c)(6), must file a Form
1024 for tax-exemption recognition.55 There are now twenty-nine
different types of rather complex organizations described in section

51
See Rev. Proc. 2012-9, 2012-2 I.R.B. (Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.irs.gov/irb/201202_IRB/ar10.html, archived at http://perma.cc/Q8PN-YTMV (noting that it is a useful
document); IRS, IRS EXEMPT ORGANIZATION FY 2012 ANNUAL REPORT & FY 2013 WORK
PLAN 1, 15–24, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/FY2012_EO_AnnualRpt_
2013_Work_Plan.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8REG-SM28 [hereinafter WORK PLAN]
(reviewing the 2013 IRS Work Plan).
52
See Tax-Exempt Status for Your Organization, I.R.S. PUB. 557, 4 (Oct. 2013),
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p557.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/4M5G-GJXE
(noting the section 501(c) application process). In general, organizations seeking a status
other than 501(c)(3) need not actually apply to the service to be considered exempt from
income tax. Thus, a social welfare organization such as many of the Tea Party applicants
could choose not to file with the Service. However, there is some risk associated with that
choice. The Service could come back later and assert penalties and interest for failure to file
taxes for a number of years. See Exempt Organizations – Help from the IRS, I.R.S. (Sept. 2,
2014),
http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Exempt-Organizations-Help-fromthe-IRS, archived at http://perma.cc/DM94-LB9V (providing customer service information
for exempt organizations at the Service office in Cincinnati, Ohio).
53
See Rev. Proc. 2013–9, 2013-2 I.R.B. (Jan. 7, 2013), http://www.irs.gov/irb/201302_IRB/ar07.html, archived at http://perma.cc/SYT5-9GA7 (describing the Cincinnati
office as a field office).
54
See Form 1023, Application for Recognition of Exemption Under Section 501(c)(3) of the
Internal Revenue Code, I.R.S., available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1023.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/7934-6T72 (taking note of the checklist).
55
See Form 1024, Application for Recognition of Exemption Under Section 501(a), I.R.S.,
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1024.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/EUU8-3PBU
(providing the tax-exemption form for welfare organizations and business leagues).
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501(c).56 Organizations that are not explicitly included within section
501(c) may also apply for an EO determination.57
The Service receives 60,000 to 70,000 applications for recognition of
exemption annually.58 These are all in paper form; there is no electronic
means for filing the form.59 Form 1023 for charitable organizations
consists of twelve pages and eight possible schedules.60 The recently
developed Form 1023EZ for small charitable organizations is much
shorter.61 Form 1024 consists of nineteen pages including schedules.62 In
addition to the forms, an organization must attach articles of
incorporation, bylaws, and numerous other supporting documents, such
as financial data, explanations of answers, and publications.63 Thus, in
some cases, a full application can be well over 100 pages.
In putting this application process into context, it is important to
note that nonprofit organizations, including social welfare organizations,
are often deeply interrelated to other nonprofit organizations by person
or idea. For instance, there are over 2000 local units of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, many of which are
organized as social welfare organizations.64 Similarly, with respect to the
Tea Party-related organizations, there appear to be hundreds of
organizations that are registered with the national Tea Party

See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (2012) (listing the twenty-nine types of exempt organizations).
See, e.g., § 521 (exempting farmers’ cooperatives from tax); § 527 (exempting political
organizations from tax).
58
See WORK PLAN, supra note 51, at 14 (noting the number of applications received); see
also Questions and Answers on 501(c) Organizations (May 15, 2013), http://www.irs.gov/
uac/Newsroom/Questions-and-Answers-on-501%28c%29-Organizations,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/8DCT-WSWG [hereinafter Questions and Answers] (noting the number of
applications received).
59
See WORK PLAN, supra note 51, at 24 (noting the current 1023 is only available in a
paper format, but the Service is working to get the funds to allow the electronic completion
of Form 1023).
60
See Form 1023, supra note 54 (providing twelve pages of the actual form and eight
possible schedules).
61
Form 1023-EZ, Streamlined Application for Recognition of Exemption Under Section
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, IRS (Jan. 28, 2015), available at
http://www.irs.gov/uac/About-Form-1023EZ, archived at http://perma.cc/5TU2-RL8J.
62
See Form 1024, supra note 55 (including nineteen pages of information and schedules
that must be completed on Form 1024).
63
See Form 1023, supra note 54 (providing a checklist of documents and information to be
included with Form 1023).
64
See NAACP, http://www.naacp.org/pages/find-your-local-unit/, archived at
http://perma.cc/M6U-5CPP?type=imagen (providing access to local units); see, e.g.,
NAACP, Pittsburgh Branch Form 990, http://www.guidestar.org/organizations/256086867/naacp-pittsburgh-branch.aspx,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/3R3N-23UA
(providing that the NAACP is a social welfare organization).
56
57
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organization.65 Many of these have filed individual applications for
exemption relying on support of the national tea party organization.66
Other times, such as in the case of some supporting organizations, there
is some tax shelter promoter who has encouraged the creation of highly
similar organizations.67
Based on 2012 data, there were about 875 employees of the
approximately 90,000 Service employees working in the EO division.68
Of those, 330 work in the Rulings and Agreements division, with about
200 of those in the Cincinnati EO determinations office.69 This is the
workforce for the Service to manage this application system. EO Rulings
and Agreements has jurisdiction to issue determination letters and ruling
statuses to tax exempt organizations under sections 501(a) and 521, as
well as a few other matters.70 Given the vast quantity of annual
applications and the resources at the Service’s disposal, although the
Service reviews every application, only a smaller set of organizations
The Service summarily approves some
receive a closer look.71
applications.72
65
See generally Locate a Local Tea Party Group, TEA PARTY COMMAND CTR. BLOGGER SPOT,
http://teapartyorg.ning.com/page/tea-party-groups, archived at http://perma.cc/8HBJFJ4U (listing over 700 Tea Party affiliates by state).
66
Id.
67
See, e.g., Stephanie Strom, I.R.S. Takes on Tax Abuse by Charity Support Groups, N.Y.
TIMES, at B1 (Feb. 14, 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/15/
business/15charity.html, archived at http://perma.cc/3CJA-EXXF (“Lois G. Lerner, director
of the exempt organizations division of the I.R.S., said the organizations that had been
examined in the continuing investigation [of supporting organizations] were largely those
linked to promoters that had been identified by other I.R.S. divisions.”).
68
See WORK PLAN, supra note 51, at 65 (noting the number of employees). Interestingly,
in 1977, when there were around 230,000 charitable organizations registered with the
Service, around 1000 employees worked in the exempt organizations office (total of 71,000
service employees). The Service issued around 2000 total determination letters a year at
that time. See also Ginsburg et al., supra note 41, at 2578, 2581, 2593 (examining the history
of the number of employees).
69
See
Annual
Information
Returns,
IRM
7.25.1.5
(Sept.
26,
2014),
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part7/irm_07-025-001.html, archived at http://perma.cc/5GWUSEZR (explaining that the EO Examinations office has jurisdiction to examine exempt
organizations).
70
See Overview, IRM 7.20.1.1 (Dec. 20, 2012), http://www.irs.gov/irm/part7/irm_07020-001.html, archived at http://perma.cc/WQE2-VXTL (noting the jurisdiction of
determination letters).
71
See WORK PLAN, supra note 51, at 14 (discussing the screening system put in place to
quickly process low risk applications).
72
Id. The Service recently developed Form 1023EZ recognizing this fact. See Form 1023EZ, Streamlined Application for Recognition of Exemption Under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code, I.R.S., http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1023ez.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/82DX-KAJG (presenting Form 1023-EZ). It allows small organizations
that meet certain requirements to file a smaller form and generally receive status much
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A review of the IRM logically suggests that an employee reviewing
applications first enters data from the application into the Service
computer system, called the Letter Information Network User System
(“LINUS”).73 The information entered into LINUS is additionally
uploaded into the EO Determination System (“EDS”).74 From the IRM, it
is not entirely clear how much information from the applications is
included in LINUS, but considering the resources of the Service in EO
determinations it appears likely that only a limited amount of
information is actually input into this computer system.75 One would
logically expect that the name of the organization, its address, and
simple yes or no questions that populate the forms are transcribed.
Information such as financial data and narrative descriptions may very
well never be entered into the database. If true, this would mean that the
ability to search this system is likely quite limited in its scope and
usefulness. A name may well be the most useful data for searching
purposes.
In its 2012 Annual Report, EO states that it uses “screening” agents
to divide applications into four different categories to process them most
efficiently.76 It is not clear from EO descriptions whether the “screening”
agents are reviewing the information in EDS or whether they are
reviewing the actual application. One presumes that it is the actual
application and could perhaps involve simultaneous data entry. The
categories include: (1) substantially complete applications where the
initial reviewer is able to say the application can be quickly approved
without further review; (2) applications that are not substantially
complete; (3) applications where minor additional information is needed;
and (4) applications where further development is needed to determine
whether the organization meets tax-exempt status.77 The report states
that 70% of 60,000 applications, or 42,000, fall into the first three
categories and, as such, are closed within 120 days of receiving the

quicker than most organizations. This recognizes that many of these small organizations
were being summarily approved anyway.
73
See Overview, IRM 7.22.2.1 (Jan. 1, 2003), http://www.irs.gov/irm/part7/irm_07022-002.html, archived at http://perma.cc/AS5V-J5CF (reviewing the Service data entry
procedures).
74
See id. (providing the application process, generally including exhibits showing screen
data captures).
75
Id.
76
See Determination Letter Processing Overview, IRM 7.20.2.1 (Aug. 24, 2012),
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part7/irm_07-020-002r.html, archived at http://perma.cc/NLS4HW4E (observing that this function is done by Technical Screeners in the Cincinnati, Ohio
office).
77
See WORK PLAN, supra note 51, at 14 (examining the four categories).
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application.78 That leaves approximately 28,000 applications falling into
the unassigned category awaiting the attention of another agent to
provide further development.
If an application falls into this unassigned category, according to the
Annual Report, the average wait time for EO to assign an agent to an
application is five months.79 However, the annual report of the Taxpayer
Advocate indicates that in 2012 the time before assignment was nine
months.80 Additionally, in August 2013, the Service website stated that
EO was assigning cases to agents that were received in April 2012.81 The
Service no longer provides this information. Its institution of Form
1023EZ, along with automatic approval of applications from
organizations willing to make certain commitments, appears to have
generally cleared this significant backlog.
The IRM directs Service agents on how to handle particular
applications with some detail.82 When an application describes an
organization that does not squarely fit within known legal precedent or
describes an issue of national significance, the case is to be transferred to
EO Technical.83 EO Technical is a group of approximately forty tax law
specialists in Washington, D.C. that is a part of the EO Rulings and
The IRM also lists twenty-one types of
Agreements division.84
organization applications that must be transferred to these forty tax law
specialists in EO Technical.85 Some of those include prepaid health
plans, organizations that present issues of commercial type insurance,
complex hospital and health care operations, credit unions, and
insurance companies.86 Some of the other types of issues that the EO
Technical group has likely had to deal with over the past five years
Id.
Id.
80
See IRS, 2012 Annual Report to Congress, TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERVICE 196 (2012),
http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/userfiles/file/Full-Report/Volume-1.pdf, archived
at http://perma.cc/FHA7-VA9S (noting the months it takes to be assigned).
81
Stalled Applications for Section 501(c)(3) Status: Is it Time to Sue the IRS?, CAPLIN &
DRYSDALE ATTORNEYS (Aug. 16, 2013), http://www.capdale.com/stalled-applications-forsection-501c3-status-is-it-time-to-sue-the-irs, archived at http://perma.cc/YQ93-R47S.
82
See Identification of EO Technical Cases, IRM 7.20.1.4 (Dec. 20, 2012),
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part7/irm_07-020-001.html, archived at http://perma.cc/WQE2VXTL (describing how the EO technical cases are identified and processed by certain
offices).
83
See id. (describing the process of more complicated applications).
84
See WORK PLAN, supra note 51, at 6 (noting the number of tax specialists).
85
See Cases Reserved for EO Technical, IRM 7.20.1.4.1 (Dec. 20, 2012),
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part7/irm_07-020-001.html, archived at http://perma.cc/WQE2VXTL (noting the types of organization applications that are sent to the national office).
86
See id. (noting the many types of organizations that must be transferred to the forty tax
specialist in Washington, D.C.).
78

79
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include the social welfare organization issue associated with the Tea
Party cases, credit counseling, down payment assistance, supporting
organizations, donor advised funds, hospitals because of new rules in
the Affordable Care Act, Mortgage Foreclosure Assistance, and Regional
Health Information Organizations.87 Each of these types of cases either
arose as a result of a change in the marketplace or a change in the law for
exempt organizations. They all present highly technical, challenging
calls for someone who practices law in the area of exempt organizations.
Not only is the law challenging, but the organizational structure
typically involves substantial complexity as well.
Also, long a part of the procedures in the Service has been a
requirement that the field send certain challenging applications to the
national office.88 The IRM long-restricted field authority by providing
that key district offices must also refer to Washington, D.C. all
applications for exemption that involve "matters of extensive public
interest, that is those in which the organization, its officers, or its
activities are likely to generate.”89 Today, the IRM reflects a similar
sentiment directing “[c]ases where issues are . . . not covered by clearly
established precedent because they may have significant regional or
national impact,” to be sent to EO Technical.90 Presumably, the Tea
Party organizations fit under that description.91 The IG speaks of a
BOLO list used by the Service to ensure agents were identifying certain
applications that should be sent to this EO Technical group.92 It is likely
that the BOLO list was a way of ensuring that the matters of “public
interest” or national impact were properly sent to EO Technical to ensure
individuals with a higher level of expertise paid attention to these
applications.

Id.
See Ginsburg et al., supra note 41, at 2592 (explaining that certain difficult applications
are sent to the national office).
89
See Cases Reserved for EO Technical, IRM 7.20.1.4 (Dec. 20, 2012),
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part7/irm_07-020-001.html, archived at http://perma.cc/WQE2VXTL (noting the types of organization applications that are sent to the national office).
The Service recently changed the TEGE organizational structure such that the national
office will no longer review these applications in the normal course of business. Rev. Proc.
2015-9, Section 5, IRB 2015-2 (Jan. 12, 2015). This recent revenue procedure does envision
that determination letters are subject to some national review through EO Rulings and
Agreements or the Office of the Chief Counsel. Id. at Section 9.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
See IG Report, supra note 2, at 6 (explaining that “the Determinations Unit began
developing a spreadsheet that would become known as the ‘Be On the Look Out’ listing”
and was abbreviated by the IG as a BOLO listing).
87
88
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Once an application is properly assigned, an agent must make a
determination. The agent can: (1) decide the organization did not
properly apply and reject the application; (2) request more information
from the organization; (3) deny the request for exemption subject to
certain procedures; or (4) grant the request and issue an exemption
letter.93 The Service directs its employees to grant tax-exempt status only
when an organization’s status fits well within established law under the
Code.94 Courts hold that tax-exemption is a matter of legislative grace
and is to be construed narrowly.95 Very few applications, however, are
in fact denied.96
3.

Procedures for a Taxpayer to Challenge an EO Determination

If the Service is going to deny an application, it will first issue a
proposed adverse determination. In that proposed denial, it will also
inform the organization of its right to either appeal or protest that denial
and request a conference to be heard.97 An organization submits an

93
See Determination Letter Processing of Exempt Organizations, IRM 7.20.2 (Aug. 24,
2012), http://www.irs.gov/irm/part7/irm_07-020-002r.html, archived at http://perma.cc/
NLS4-HW4E (reviewing the denial and acceptance options); see also Rev. Proc. 2012-9, § 7,
2012-2 I.R.B. (Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.irs.gov/irb/2012-02_IRB/ar10.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/DWT4-P3DG (detailing the procedures available for an organization
denied exempt status including the right to first receive a proposed denial and the right to
protest that denial).
94
See Cases Reserved for EO Technical, IRM 7.20.1.4.1 (Dec. 20, 2012),
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part7/irm_07-020-001.html, archived at http://perma.cc/WQE2VXTL (providing strict instructions for EO processing employees to follow when they
process exempt organization applications).
95
See, e.g., IHC Health Plans, Inc. v. Comm'r, 325 F.3d 1188, 1193–94 (10th Cir. 2003)
(holding that tax exemption is a “matter of legislative grace” and therefore, it should be
construed narrowly); Mut. Aid Ass'n of Church of the Brethren v. United States, 759 F.2d
792, 794 (10th Cir. 1985) (holding tax exemption is a “matter of legislative grace” and is
construed narrowly); Haswell v. United States, 205 Ct. Cl. 421, 500 F.2d 1133, 1140 (1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1975) (“Tax exemptions are matters of legislative grace and
taxpayers have the burden of establishing their entitlement to exemptions.”).
96
See, e.g., Rob Reich, Lacy Dorn & Stefanie Sutton, Anything Goes: Approval of Nonprofit
Status by the IRS, STANFORD CTR. ON PHILANTHROPY AND CIVIL SOC’Y 8 (Oct. 2009),
http://web.stanford.edu/group/reichresearch/cgi-bin/site/wp-content/uploads/2009/
11/Anything-Goes-PACS-11-09.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8UMD-UD2M (finding in
a recent study that the Service has annually denied between 0.74% and 2.17% of
applications for charitable status during the late 1990s to 2008).
97
See Rev. Proc. 2013-9, § 7, 2013-2 I.R.B. (Jan. 7, 2013), http://www.irs.gov/irb/201302_IRB/ar07.html, archived at http://perma.cc/WDP8-HPPZ (explaining the denial and
appeal procedures); Rev. Proc. 2013-9, 2013-2 I.R.B. 262–63 (Jan. 7, 2013), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb13-02.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/S9XU-N9D3
(providing the procedure to follow when an exempt status is denied).
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appeal made to the appeals division of the Service (“Appeals”).98
Appeals has the authority to override the proposed adverse
determination.99 Additionally, if the organization submits a protest, the
Service will review that protest and consider granting status.100 Where
the Service determines the organization does not qualify, it will then
issue a final adverse determination.101
Congress limits the rights of taxpayers wishing to challenge actions
of the Service. Congress has long maintained the Anti-injunction Act to
prohibit a suit against the Service “for the purpose of restraining the
assessment or collection of any tax.”102 The primary avenue to challenge
Service action is through refund jurisdiction.103 A taxpayer must pay the
tax to have access to a United States District Court or to the Federal
Claims Court.104 Congress provides a taxpayer an avenue to US Tax
Court if the taxpayer files a claim within ninety days of receiving a notice
of deficiency from the Service.105
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Anti-Injunction Act to be the
expressed opinion of Congress that the Service should be provided
significant discretion without judicial oversight to most expeditiously
collect federal revenue.106 Additionally, the Court recognizes a need to
protect the Service from litigation before a suit for a refund.107
The Court held that the Anti-Injunction Act prohibits an action
challenging a Service EO determination. In Bob Jones University v. Simon,
the Court reviewed a revocation of charitable exempt status by the
Service.108 The Court held that as long as the Service appeared to be
engaged in a good faith effort to enforce the law, there was no reason to
upset the great deference that Congress grants to the Service in its
Only upon a showing of both
revenue-enforcing activities.109
“irreparable injury” and that “it is clear that under no circumstances
could the [g]overnment ultimately prevail” could a suit for injunction
98
See Rev. Proc. 2013-9, 2013-2 I.R.B. 262–63 (Jan. 7, 2013), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb13-02.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/S9XU-N9D3
(explaining the appeal process when an exempt status is denied by EO Determinations or
EO Technical).
99
Id. at 262.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 263.
102
26 U.S.C. § 7421 (2012).
103
Id. § 7422(e).
104
Id. § 7422(d).
105
Id. § 6213(a).
106
Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 736 (1974).
107
Id.
108
Id. at 726–27.
109
Id. at 740.
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proceed.110 The Court acknowledged that the regime adopted by
Congress was a harsh one.111 “The degree of bureaucratic control that,
practically speaking, has been placed in the Service over those in
petitioner's position is susceptible of abuse, regardless of how
conscientiously the Service may attempt to carry out its
responsibilities.”112 Nevertheless, the Court held that it did not have
jurisdiction to review the suit.113 The Taxpayer had a sufficient remedy
though because it could pay a tax and challenge the determination
through refund jurisdiction.114
Since that time, Congress enacted section 7428 to provide charitable
organizations a judicial procedure to contest a denial or revocation of
exempt status. Section 7428 provides that charitable organizations and
certain cooperatives may challenge a denial or revocation of a
determination in court.115 Section 7428 also provides this right to these
same organizations if the Service has not acted on an application within
270 days from the filing of the application if the organization has taken
all timely steps to secure a determination.116 Before the passage of
section 7428, the only opportunity charitable organizations had to
challenge a Service determination was to pay a small tax, such as the
employment tax, and file for a refund on the basis that the organization
did not owe the tax because it was exempt from tax as a charitable
organization.117 Congress has not provided this right to any other
exempt organization, including social welfare organizations. These
organizations still have access to court to contest a denial by paying a
small tax and then claiming a refund on the basis that the organization is
exempt from taxation.118
4.

Concluding Thoughts on the Determination System

There is little positive law to guide the Service’s management of the
determination process. In the case of the Tea Party organizations that
Id. at 737 (citing Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962)).
Id. at 749.
112
Bob Jones Univ., 416 U.S. at 749–50.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 746.
115
See 26 U.S.C. § 7428(a) (2012) (examining the statute for the right to judicially
challenge a denial or revocation of a determination).
116
Id. § 7428(b)(2).
117
See Bob Jones Univ., 416 U.S. at 727–28, 731 (1974) (holding that the Anti-Injunction Act
prevented the university from seeking a declaratory judgment that the revocation of its
exempt status as a charitable organization was improper without a showing of irreparable
injury and lack of a reasonable interpretation of the Code).
118
Id. at 746.
110
111
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applied for social welfare status, there is no positive law requiring the
Service to administer an application system at all. However, the Service
employs extensive procedures to manage the exempt organization
determination process, and it discusses how it manages that function on
an annual basis. Furthermore, no Service procedure appears to prohibit
the use of a name in its screening process. In fact, the evidence is that in
high profile and other cases it has encouraged the use of names.
Part II.B briefly turns to the examination function.119 The primary
purpose of the Part is to describe the efforts the Service uses to identify
taxpayer returns to review for audit.120 While there has been little effort
to consider the appropriateness of those particular processes from a
justice standpoint, this Article operates from a presumption that these
selection methods, so long used, are widely accepted as reasonable
methods. Additionally, it traces the history of Service and Congressional
recognition of how to best use the scarce resources of the Service.
B. Examination Process
In the examinations process, the Service examines every return
through an automated process, but picks organizations and individuals
through a screening procedure to subject to the closer scrutiny of an
audit. The Service uses a variety of means to select taxpayers for audit
such as random statistical selection, known as the Discriminate
Inventory Function System (“DIF score”), failure of certain Service
information reporting to match up, and related party examinations.121
1.

Very Short History of Examination

The first US income tax, enacted in 1862, required the newly-created
office of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to use independent
assistant assessors to collect and review every return of every person.122
Quoting from a guide for assessors from the time, Professor Camp notes
that “[e]ach assistant needed to ‘have continually before him an intimate
See infra Part II.B (reviewing the Service’s examination process).
See infra Part II.B (describing the efforts used by the Service to select taxpayer returns
for audit).
121
See, e.g., IRS Audits, I.R.S. (June 23, 2014), http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/SmallBusinesses-&-Self-Employed/IRS-Audits, archived at http://perma.cc/P58N-XXPA
(providing a description of selection methods); Tax-Exempt Status for Your Org., I.R.S. PUB.
557, 2 (2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p557.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/4M5G-GJXE (explaining the Service’s exempt organizations select check).
122
ROY G. BLAKEY & GLADYS C. BLAKEY, THE FED. INCOME TAX 527 (1940); see Theory and
Practice in Tax Administration, supra note 11, at 229–34 (discussing the development of this
process). This Part draws heavily from Bryan Camp’s work.
119
120
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knowledge of his division, with it shops, factories, storehouses and
stores . . . . Each assistant also needed to know ‘every person in his
division who may be liable to license duty or income assessment.’”123
There were 300 employees in Washington, D.C. and 3000 in the field to
carry out this work.124 Employees in the central office would review the
work of the assessors in the field, but the system was controlled in the
field by the personal assessments of the assistants.125 Whether the
Service was truly effective at accomplishing this personal collection goal
is unclear.
The 1913 income tax quickly made clear that the Service could not
realistically personally review every return. Evidence shows that as
early as World War I the quantity of returns overwhelmed the abilities of
the staff of the Service; the employees could not manage the onslaught.126
The law still required mostly D.C.-centric assessors to review all returns
and assess taxes by June 30.127 However, all they were really able to do
was to check for mathematical errors.128 The Service estimated at the
time that approximately 5% of the individual returns and 15% of the
corporate returns should have been investigated more thoroughly.129
The workforce with this new income tax stayed relatively stable, but
the number of returns increased exponentially. In 1915, the Service
employed a workforce of 520 employees in Washington, D.C. and about
4200 outside of Washington.130 These employees reviewed around
500,000 returns that year.131 In 1917, taxpayers submitted more than 3.5
million returns.132 The agency found itself with a backlog of returns such
that by 1923 they were behind by 3 million returns.133
To manage this backlog, the Service tripled its workforce by 1919.134
It also shifted some assessment work to assistant collectors in the field.135
123
Theory and Practice in Tax Administration, supra note 11, at 232 (quoting Treasury
Circular 22, reprinted in CHARLES N. EMERSON, EMERSON’S INTERNAL REVENUE GUIDE 17
(Samuel Bowles & Co., Springfield, Mass., 1867)).
124
Id. at 233.
125
See id. (explaining the tax process).
126
See BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 122, at 528 (noting the difficulties the Service
experienced with personally reviewing every return).
127
See Tariff Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 169 (1915) (setting out the rules for
assessments).
128
See BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 122, at 529 (addressing the clerks’ general lack of
accounting and legal proficiency).
129
See id. (discussing statistics reported by the Service).
130
I.R.S., DEP’T OF THE TREAS., IRS HISTORICAL FACT BOOK: A CHRONOLOGY 89 (1993).
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
See BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 122, at 530 (explaining the dramatic increase in
returns).
134
Theory and Practice in Tax Administration, supra note 11, at 238.
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Although at the time the idea of an audit lacked specificity, during this
period the idea arose that some returns should be subject to more
scrutiny than others, that is, some returns would be audited.136 The
Service processed and reviewed all returns to determine whether they
should be accepted, but the Service did not audit all returns.137 The 1918
changes to assessment procedure codified this idea of audit.138 Before
1918, the law required the Service to make an assessment before any tax
was due and owing, but after 1918 taxpayers had to pay the tax liability
reflected on their returns when the returns were due.139 The law now
required the Service to assess the taxes “as soon as practicable.”140
This distinction between audit and return processing became
complete during World War II. During the war, the taxpaying
population went from 7.6 million in 1939 to 42 million in 1945.141 The
Service increased its workforce from 22,000 employees to almost
50,000.142 Professor Camp notes that whereas agents used to interact
primarily with sophisticated taxpayers associated with businesses who
kept good records, agents began to interact with the members of the
public, who kept little in the way of records at all.143 By the 1950s it was
apparent that the Service could not review every return personally as
had been initially established.144 Professor Camp notes this time as the
beginning of automatic data processing and the treatment of individuals
not as individuals but as part of broad batches of taxpayers.145
The moral of the story is that the Service maintains a system where it
can only enforce the law by picking and choosing a small sample of
returns in the hopes of deterring other individuals from filing improper
returns. This is typically referred to as the voluntary income tax
system.146 The accuracy and correctness of the system relies a great deal
upon an expectation that taxpayers will follow the law. It backs that up
by auditing a small number of taxpayers, and by sometimes prosecuting

See id. (discussing the increase in workers).
See id. at 239 (addressing the changing goals surrounding tax returns).
137
Id.
138
See Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 254, 40 Stat. 1057, 1082–83 (1919) (showing the
requirement of a taxpayer to pay tax with a return).
139
Id.
140
Revenue Act of 1918, § 250, 40 Stat. at 1083.
141
See Theory and Practice in Tax Administration, supra note 11, at 240 (discussing the
significant change in the number of tax payers over six years).
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id. at 241.
145
Id. at 240–41.
146
See Camp, supra note 15, at 5.
135
136
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violators with criminal sanctions.147 This means though that the Service
must make decisions daily about whom to review more closely. As a
result, the law will be enforced in a selective manner. Audit results in
the Service treating similarly situated taxpayers differently. Part II.B.2
reviews the little that is known today about Service audit selection
methods.148
2.

Current Examination Selection

Today, there are a number of ways the Service might select a tax
return for audit. On the Service Small Business Self-Employed webpage,
the Service provides the three main ways it selects returns for audit: (1)
computer screening using statistics (using a DIF score); (2) information
reporting; and (3) related examinations.149 Other factors may affect the
Service’s selection of returns for audit. For instance, other audit triggers
include a return demonstrating a taxpayer with significant wealth,
referrals, notoriety, or certain deductions that the Service finds are
subject to abuse.150
a.

DIF

Developed in the 1950s when the Service began using the ADP
process, a DIF score is based on a multi-factor computer process that
allows the Service to determine that a particular return deviates too
much from an expected range.151 By placing returns into batches or
identical classes reflecting income or other characteristics, the Service is
able to use the computer to detect significant variations from the norm.152
Agents pick returns with high DIF scores for a quick examination to

147
In fact, it is no secret that the Service specifically targets individuals of a high profile
nature in its criminal enforcement to have the greatest enforcement effect in this endeavor.
Joshua D. Blank, In Defense of Individual Tax Privacy, 61 EMORY L. J. 265, 293 (2011).
148
See infra Part II.B.2 (reviewing the Service’s audit selection methods).
149
See IRS Audits, supra note 121 (explaining the three main methods the Service uses to
select returns for audit).
150
See DAVID M. RICHARDSON, JEROME BORISON & STEVE JOHNSON, CIVIL TAX PROCEDURE
97–98 (2d ed. 2008) (providing factors for consideration when the Service selects returns for
audits).
151
See id. at 95–96 (explaining DIF, which is a multi-factor computer process); see also
Discriminant Index Function (DIF) Overview, IRM 4.1.3.2 (Aug. 10, 2012), available at
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/irm_04-001-003.html#d0e258,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/J5VW-5VH7 (setting out the types of DIF returns).
152
See generally Discriminant Index Function (DIF) Overview, IRM 4.1.3.2 (Aug. 10, 2012),
available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/irm_04-001-003.html#d0e258, archived at
http://perma.cc/J5VW-5VH7 (delineating the classes of DIF returns).
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determine whether the return needs to go for a full audit.153 The agents
also determine the type of examination the exam should undergo.154
The formulae are secret and cannot be obtained via discovery or the
Freedom of Information Act.155 The Service initially operated a program
that allowed significant precision in its DIF score system. However, the
program, called the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program
(“TCMP”), apparently subjected taxpayers to significant annoyance. For
this reason, Congress forced the Service to shut the program down.156
The Service ended the program in 1988, and some say that its shutdown
has resulted in the DIF score being less reliable than it used to be.157 The
Service now runs a program called the National Research Program,
started in the 2000s to replace the TCMP program.158
b.

Information Reporting

The second audit trigger is based on information from conflicting
information returns. The Service receives significant information from
third-party payors.159 This information allows the Service to confirm the
accuracy of information reported by taxpayers on their returns.160 For
instance, employers file a W-2 form indicating how much income they
paid an employee and how much tax they withheld; institutions like
banks that pay interest must file a 1099-INT informing the Service how
much interest a taxpayer received; corporations must file a 1099-DIV
informing the Service how much in dividends a taxpayer received. All
of this vast information is placed into a computer and matched against
taxpayer returns to find discrepancies.161 Where there is a discrepancy, a
letter is triggered asking the taxpayer to explain the discrepancy.162 A
Id.
Id.
155
See 26 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(2) (2012) (stipulating the confidentiality and disclosure of
returns and return information).
156
RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 150, at 96; NAT’L RESEARCH PROGRAM, CHALLENGES
ASSOCIATED WITH COLLECTING COMPLIANCE DATA 12 (June 12, 2002), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/cocompda.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/NYS8UGYC (explaining that the Service stopped using the TCMP in 1988).
157
RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 150, at 96; NAT’L RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 156,
at 10.
158
RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 150, at 96; NAT’L RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 156,
at 1; see National Research Program (NRP), I.R.S. (Aug. 18, 2012), http://www.irs.gov/uac/
National-Research-Program-%28NRP%29, archived at http://perma.cc/X643-A2MT
(discussing the Service NRP and its plan to update its DIF system).
159
RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 150, at 96.
160
Id.
161
Id.
162
Id.
153
154
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failure to explain, or a significant discrepancy, can result in an audit of
the taxpayer.163 The evidence is that any income subject to information
reporting is reported at a highly accurate level.164 Where there is no
information reporting, income is not reported at a highly accurate
level.165
c.

Related Examinations

The third audit trigger is based on being a party related to a party
that the Service is auditing. Some refer to this third type of selection as
selection by infection.166 On this matter, the Service states, “returns may
be selected for audit when they involve issues or transactions with other
taxpayers, such as business partners or investors, whose returns were
selected for audit.”167 Thus, the Service takes into account information it
receives from one return to identify other parties it may need to review.
Even if the Service has no specific information that one of these other
parties has violated the Code, to be complete, the Service pulls in each of
the important parties to the audit.168 This could mean that if a closely
held corporation’s return is examined, then the shareholders’ returns
might be examined as well.
3.

Final Thoughts on Examination Process as it Relates to the
Determinations Process

The task set in this Article is to determine whether the IG had a
proper legal or ethical basis for asserting that it was inappropriate for the
Service to select an application for central review based on the
applicant’s names. The Service has suggested that it utilized the names
of the Tea Party in screening applications to centralize review and to
ensure uniformity.169 The history of the examination process illustrates
that the Service regularly faces the problem of insufficient resources to
manage its mandate.170 Because the Service receives so many returns

Id. at 96–97.
Id. at 97
165
RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 150, at 97.
166
Id. at 98.
167
IRS Audits, supra note 121.
168
See Examination of Returns, Appeal Rights, and Claims for Refund, I.R.S. PUB. 556, 3 (Sept.
2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p556.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
2WJL-VKQR (“The information is evaluated for reliability and accuracy before it is used as
the basis of an examination or investigation.”).
169
Questions and Answers, supra note 58.
170
See infra Part II.A (discussing the problems with the determinations process); see also
GARY C. BRYNER, BUREAUCRATIC DISCRETION 1 (1987) (suggesting that most agencies appear
163
164
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and does not have enough employees or resources to evaluate all
returns, the Service must focus on only a small selected set of taxpayers.
Additionally, while the Service picks returns in very structured ways
based on numbers and reporting failures, some returns are picked
because of names, for example in the case of related party audits.171 In
those cases, the Service has identified an issue first, but then picks whom
to audit based in part on the name.172 Arguably, the organizations with
the Tea Party name were all related parties, and, as will be developed in
Part II.C, the Service had reason to believe these organizations might not
qualify for the status they were seeking.173
C. What Happened in the Case of the Tea Party Organizations?
To summarize the enormous amount of detail now available
regarding the Tea Party matter, the Service explains that it began to see
an uptick in applications for status as social welfare organizations in the
years 2010 and 2011.174 The increase seemed to be associated with
organizations engaged in political activities.175 The Service referred to
this set of politically engaged social welfare organization applications as
“Tea Party” cases.176 The Service suggested that the uptick occurred as a
result of the Court’s Citizens United opinion.177 While all tax exempt
organizations may engage in some politically related activities, in the
case of social welfare organizations, the primary activity of the
organization cannot be to intervene in a political campaign.178
To handle this increase of applications of social welfare
organizations that appeared to be engaging in some level of campaign
intervention, the Service decided to “centralize” the applications.179 This
meant that these applications were routed to agents who had experience
to suffer from the problem of Congress providing a mandate too large for the resources
provided).
171
RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 150, at 98.
172
Id.
173
See infra Part II.C (discussing the interrelation of hundreds of organizations registered
with the Tea Party).
174
Questions and Answers, supra note 58.
175
Id.
176
Id.
177
See Paul Blumenthal, IRS Tea Party Targeting Came After Court Rulings Upended Agency
Role, HUFF. POST (May 14, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/14/irs-teaparty-targeting_n_3272849.html, archived at http://perma.cc/6JKK-HTQQ (discussing the
large uptick in 501(c)(4) applications after FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life and Citizens United).
178
See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii) (“The promotion of social welfare does not
include direct or indirect participation or intervention in political campaigns on behalf of or
in opposition to any candidate for public office.”).
179
Questions and Answers, supra note 58.
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in reviewing politically active social welfare organizations so that the
cases would be “worked consistently.”180 There is some discrepancy as
to whether the initial decision was to focus on politically-engaged
organizations or whether it was to focus on Tea Party-related
organizations alone. Some testimony indicates that some Service
employees viewed the term Tea Party cases as a generic category, like
someone might refer to coke as a generic term for soft drink.181 Other
testimony seems to suggest that some employees understood in the early
stage that they should be pulling and looking at only Tea Party-related
organizations and should avoid looking at any others.182
Over a part of the period of the audit performed by TIGTA, review
agents selected 298 organizations for screening of political activities.183
The IG report identifies that ninety-six of these 298 cases included “tea
party,” “Patriot,” or “9/12” groups—all ideologically conservative.184
The allegiance of the other 202 organizations is not definitively known,
although some appear to be liberal, some conservative, and some do not
appear to have a political allegiance at all. The most troubling fact to
TIGTA seemed to be that every organization with the “Tea Party” in the
organization’s name ended up in this review group, but the same did not
happen for every organization with the word “progressive” in its
name.185
The IG also objected to the length of time these organizations were
subjected to review and to the excessive questions that these
organizations faced.186 It is not clear whether the IG assessed how the
Id.
Blumenthal, supra note 177.
182
Id.
183
IG Report, supra note 2, at 10.
184
Id. at 8.
185
In a letter from the IG to Representative Levin on June 26, 2013, the IG explained that
at the request of Representative Levin, the IG performed an additional audit of the
applications that the IG had reviewed. Letter from J. Russell George, Inspector General, to
Sander M. Levin, Michigan Representative (June 26, 2013), available at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/tigta_final_response_to_rep._levin_6.26.1
3.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/QS76-W8N9. In that additional audit, the IG reviewed
whether the Service had reviewed all organizations with the word “progress” or
“progressive” in their titles. Id. The IG found that not all such organizations were
subjected to greater scrutiny. Id. There was some confusion though about the use of the
term “progressive.” Some news reports suggested that the IG found that the Service had
not subjected “progressive” organization to enhanced review of political activities. Alan
Framm, J. Russell George, No Sign Progressives Were Mistreated by IRS, HUFF. POST: POLITICS
(Aug. 27, 2013), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/27/progressivesirs_n_3509983.html?, archived at http://perma.cc/T9EH-FEWE. However, the only thing
the IG said was that not every organization with the word “progressive” in its name was
screened into the political activities basket. Id.
186
IG Report, supra note 2, at 8.
180
181
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questions provided to these organizations compared in intrusiveness,
but the IG did determine that on average, organizations that got placed
into this review group experienced a longer wait time in obtaining an
exemption letter than the average organization applying for
exemption.187 Although the IG determined that the Service used
inappropriate criteria, it found no evidence that the Service intentionally
engaged in this activity.188 Its evidence pointed more strongly to some
management failures to run an effective operation that maintained
proper controls over the determination system.
Importantly for the case made below, the IG found that the Service
did not in fact operate with bias in its actions.189 It identified no one that
appeared to be carrying out a scheme to enforce the law more harshly
against conservative organizations.190 The Senate Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations found the same.191
III. LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR SOCIAL WELFARE ORGANIZATIONS
This Part examines the rules that apply to social welfare
organizations. The ambiguity of the social welfare legal regime is
relevant to the consideration of the discretion the Service exercised in
this Tea Party affair. It is a highly fact dependent inquiry. The ability to
compare many of similar type organizations that present similar facts
can aid the regulator in making consistent judgments regarding
exemption.
Organizations described in section 501(c)(4) include civic leagues or
organizations not organized for profit and operated exclusively for the
promotion of social welfare.192 Although Congress used the words
“operated exclusively,” the Treasury regulations require social welfare
organizations to be “primarily engaged in promoting in some way the
common good and general welfare of the people of the community.”193
That Treasury Regulations do not interpret the term “exclusively”
literally, which is not inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent. In
Better Business Bureau, the Court stated that exclusively “plainly means
Id. at 15.
Id. at 5.
189
Id. at 7.
190
Id.
191
UNITED STATES S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, IRS AND TIGTA MGMT
FAILURES RELATED TO SECTION 501(C)(4) APPLICANTS ENGAGED IN POLITICAL ACTIVITY 1
(Sept. 5, 2014), available at file:///C:/Users/lawrev.LAWSCHOOL/Downloads/
REPORT%20-%20IRS%20&%20TIGTA%20Mgmt%20Failures%20Related%20to%20501(c)
(4)%20(Sept%205%202014,%209-9-14%20update).pdf.
192
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i) (as amended in 1990).
193
Id. (emphasis added).
187
188
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that the presence of a single non-educational purpose, if substantial in
nature, will destroy the exemption regardless of the number or
importance of truly educational purposes.”194
The regulations state that a social welfare purpose includes working
toward “bringing about civic betterments and social improvements.”195
An organization is not considered to be exempt under section 501(c)(4) to
the extent it provides benefits only to its members and not to the whole
community.196 The Service acknowledged the significant lack of clarity
as to the meaning of a social welfare purpose in a continuing
professional education text when it referred to this category as a “catchall” for those beneficial organizations that it could not quite fit into the
category of charitable.197
Some early courts tried to define the term civic organization. In
United States v. Pickwick Electric Membership Corp., the court stated that
civic organizations involve “citizens of a community cooperating to
promote the common good and general welfare of people of the
community.”198 Another court similarly defined civic organizations as a
“movement of the citizenry or of the community.”199 Although this is a
different phrase than social welfare, the idea of a civic organization is
also an aid to determining whether an organization qualifies under
section 501(c)(4).
In 2009, about 9500 social welfare organizations reported holding
almost $100 billion in assets, receiving approximately $85 billion in
revenue, and incurring about $82.5 billion in expenses.200 Among the

Better Bus. Bureau of D.C. v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945).
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i); see also Erie Endowment v. United States, 316 F.2d
151, 156 (3d Cir. 1963) (holding that civic “organization[s] must be a community movement
designed to accomplish community ends").
196
See, e.g., Contracting Plumbers Coop. Restoration Corp. v. United States, 488 F.2d 684,
687 (2d Cir. 1973) (finding membership organization of plumbers that repaired potholes of
streets only its members had an obligation to repair not operated for a social welfare
purpose because “each member of the cooperative enjoys these economic terms precisely to
the extent he uses . . . [the] restoration services”); Vision Serv. Plan, Inc. v. United States,
265 Fed. App’x. 650, 651 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding vision services health maintenance
organization not organized for social welfare because it “benefits VSP’s subscribers rather
than the general welfare of the community”).
197
Social Welfare: What Does it Mean? How Much Private Benefit is Permissible? What is a
Community? I.R.S. EXEMPT ORG. CONTINUING PROF’L EDUC. TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION
PROGRAM FOR 1981, Ch. G, at 39 (1981), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irstege/eotopicg81.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/S79X-QV3Q.
198
158 F.2d 272, 276 (6th Cir. 1946).
199
Comm’r v. Lake Forest, Inc., 305 F.2d 814, 818 (4th Cir. 1962).
200
SOI Tax Stats—Charities & Other Tax-Exempt Orgs. Statistics, I.R.S. (last updated Aug.
12,
2014),
http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Charities-and-Other-Tax-ExemptOrganizations-Statistics, archived at http://perma.cc/96UQ-X56A.SOI.
194
195
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types of organizations that qualify as social welfare organizations are
homeowners associations, health maintenance organizations, and many
organizations that advocate for a particular cause.201
A contribution to a social welfare organization is not deductible
under section 170 of the Code; however, payments to social welfare
organizations may be deductible under another Code section.202 For
instance, a payment to a health maintenance organization for employee
insurance may qualify for a medical expense deduction.203
Whatever social welfare or civic means, people and institutions have
long used social welfare organizations as a vehicle to advocate partisan
positions. For instance, in 1945 in Debs Memorial Radio Fund v.
Commissioner, the United States Second Circuit Court of Appeals found
that the operation of a radio station that was founded in 1928 to advocate
“liberal or progressive” views established that the organization was
operated for a social welfare purpose under the Code.204 Today, many
individuals and groups establish social welfare organizations to educate
the public on partisan issues and to lobby to promote a particular
cause.205 In fact, charities often form social welfare organizations to
conduct lobbying on their behalf.206 The Court explicitly approved of
such partisan positions being advocated by social welfare organizations
on behalf of charitable organizations in Regan v. Taxation with
Representation.207 Finally, the Service has stated that a social welfare

201
See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 528(a) (2012) (qualifying many homeowner’s associations for
income tax exemption).
202
See, e.g., § 162(6)(C) (providing an exemption for employee health insurance).
203
Such a payment would be deductible to the employer under § 162(6)(C) as an
ordinary and necessary business expense, as well as excluded from the compensation of the
employee under § 106(a) (2012).
204
148 F.2d 948, 951 (2d Cir. 1945).
205
Lobbying has a very specific meaning for the Code and particularly for exempt
organizations. It draws meaning from the limitation on charitable organizations to conduct
no more than a substantial part of activity that constitutes the “carrying on of propaganda
or otherwise attempting[] to influence legislation.” § 501(h) (2012). However, there is no
need for a lengthy discussion of lobbying herein as the major issue associated with social
welfare organizations is whether they are intervening in a political campaign.
206
Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc., for instance, is a charitable
organization under § 501(c)(3), but employs the Planned Parenthood Action Fund, Inc. as
its major lobbying arm.
See About Us, PLANNED PARENTHOOD (2015),
http://www.plannedparenthoodaction.org/about-us/, archived at http://perma.cc/PCT7P272; see also I.R.S. FORM 990, EIN 12-1644147 at 50, 77, 80–83 (2012), available at
http://www.plannedparenthood.org/files/2413/9620/1318/PPFA_FY13_Final_990_publi
c_disclosure.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/E63M-XUQT.
207
461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983).
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organization may engage in lobbying as its sole activity as long as the
activity is consistent with its exempt purpose.208
Although it is not entirely clear why there is a qualitative difference
for purposes of qualifying for a social welfare purpose between lobbying
and intervening in a political campaign, the latter is not considered a
valid social welfare purpose. The Treasury regulations explicitly state
that the “direct or indirect participation or intervention in political
campaigns on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for public
office” explicitly does not advance a social welfare purpose.209 The Court
implicitly accepted this idea in Taxation with Representation as well when
it accepted that the exemption arrangement established in the Code
allowed charitable activities to be conducted by charitable organizations,
lobbying to be conducted by social welfare organizations, and campaign
intervention through a PAC under section 527.210 According to Service
guidance, a social welfare organization may intervene in a political
campaign as long as intervening in a political campaign is not the
organization’s primary activity.211
However, knowing that a social welfare organization may not
intervene in a campaign to promote social welfare tells us neither when
an organization has intervened in a campaign nor when it has done too
much intervening. These two legal questions were at the heart of the Tea
Party matter. Until recently, our best understanding of what it meant to
intervene in a campaign came from the definition of that term for
charitable organizations.212 In that guidance, the Service provided
twenty-one situations applying a facts and circumstances test to
208
Rev. Rul. 61-177, 1961-2 C.B. 117, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/rr61177.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/9MYH-543G; see also John
Francis Reilly & Barbara A. Braig Allen, Political Campaign and Lobbying Activities of IRC
501(c)(4), (c)(5) and (c)(6), EXEMPT ORGS.-TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FY 2003 L-2
(explaining the general rules about lobbying and political campaign activities by exempt
organizations); Ellen P. Aprill, Regulating the Political Speech of Noncharitable Exempt Orgs.
After Citizens United, 10 ELECTION L.J. 363, 375–91 (2011).
209
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii) (as amended in 1990).
210
Tax’n with Representation, 461 U.S. at 544.
211
Rev. Rul. 81-95, 1981-1 C.B. 332 (last visited Apr. 12, 2015); Reilly & Allen, supra note
208; Aprill, supra note 208, at 381. An organization that engages primarily in intervening in
political campaigns is instead described in section 527 of the Code assuming the
organization follows the requirements of that section. Also, a tax is imposed on the lesser
of investment income or an amount spent on political activity of any organization exempt
under section 501(a) because section 501(c) describes when such an organization engages in
political activity. 26 U.S.C. § 527(f) (2012). For more information on that relationship, see
Rev. Rul. 2004-6, 2004-4 I.R.B. (Jan. 26, 2004), http://www.irs.gov/irb/200404_IRB/ar10.html, archived at http://perma.cc/A7Y6-CKZZ?type=image.
212
Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-25 I.R.B. (June 18, 2007), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/
irs-drop/rr-07-41.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/W8UW-AWXN.
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determine whether an organization was advocating for or against a
candidate for public office.213 Despite utilizing twenty-one different
situations as a result of the adoption of a facts and circumstances test,
there is still much room for administrative discretion.214 The Service
recently proposed regulations to clarify this area of law for social welfare
organizations.215 However, after receiving over 150,000 comments, the
Service decided to reconsider its proposed regulations.216
Determining whether an organization has intervened in a political
campaign too much is no less ambiguous or contentious. The initial
problem is that the statute requires a social welfare organization to
operate exclusively for a social welfare purpose.217 The regulation,
however, interprets the term exclusively to mean primarily.218 The
inquiry tends to focus on whether the activity evinces a dominant or just
an ancillary purpose of the organization based on all the facts and
circumstances.219 In Contracting Plumbers, a case focused on the
exclusively standard of the statute, the court stated regarding the
requirement that, “we adhere to the rule that the presence of a single
substantial non-exempt purpose precludes exempt status regardless of
the number or importance of the exempt purposes.”220 This standard
leaves much room for administrative discretion.
Unlike charitable organizations, most of which are required to file a
notice via the Form 1023 to be recognized as exempt by the Service, there
is no such notice that social welfare organizations are required to file to

Id.
Id.
215
Treasury, IRS Will Issue Proposed Guidance for Tax-Exempt Social Welfare Organizations,
I.R.S. (Nov. 26, 2013), http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/Treasury,-IRS-Will-IssueProposed-Guidance-for-Tax-Exempt-Social-Welfare-Organizations,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/F2S4-8F9F.
216
Reg-134417-13, 2013-52 I.R.B. (Dec. 23, 2013), http://www.irs.gov/irb/201352_IRB/ar18.html, archived at http://perma.cc/6EJW-32RV.
217
Martha B. Lackritz, Comments on Proposed Regulations Show Exempt Organizations’
Concerns, ADLER & COLVIN (Oct. 2014), available at http://www.adlercolvin.com/pdf/
COMMENTS_ON_PROPOSED_REGULATIONS_SHOW_EXEMPT_ORGANIZATIONS__
CONCERNS__Taxation_of_Exempts__WG_L___Se.doc%20%20%2800632574xA3536%29.p
df, archived at http://perma.cc/JZP6-KWPR.
218
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2) (2013).
219
For a short discussion of the issue regarding primary and exclusively, see Philip T.
Hackney, A Response to Professor Leff’s Tax Planning “Olive Branch” for Marijuana Dealers, 99
IOWA L. REV. BULL. 25, 29 (2014).
220
Contracting Plumbers Coop. Restoration Corp. v. United States, 488 F.2d 684, 686 (2d
Cir. 1973).
213
214

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol49/iss2/9

Hackney: Should the IRS Never "Target" Taxpayers? An Examination of the I

2015]

An Examination of the IRS Tea Party Affair

485

be recognized as exempt organizations.221 A social welfare organization
must annually file a Form 990 Return of an Exempt Organization.222
An organization formed to be a social welfare organization that fails
because it conducts too much political activity is classified as a taxable
organization.223 If the organization follows correct procedures, however,
by filing a notice with the Service, it would be exempt as a political
organization under section 527.224 A section 527 political organization
pays tax on its net investment income and is otherwise exempt from
income tax.225 Importantly, no section in the Code makes it illegal to
speak or organize. Thus, the regime being enforced with respect to the
Tea Party was simply a matter of classifying the organization as taxable
or tax-exempt. Additionally, and importantly in understanding a part of
the political battle taking place with respect to the Tea Party matter, a
section 527 organization must disclose its donors while a social welfare
organization is not required to make this disclosure.226 Many political
operatives choose to form social welfare organizations to advocate for
campaigns in order to provide anonymity to their donors.227 The money
placed into social welfare organizations for this purpose is often referred
to as “dark money.”228
In conclusion, while the law regarding social welfare organizations
presents some administrative challenges for the Service, some amount of
221
There is no provision comparable to section 508 that applies to social welfare
organizations. Rev. Rul. 80-108, 1980-1 C.B. 119, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irstege/rr80-108.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/QEC3-LW8V; see
also Rev. Rul. 81-177, 1981-2 C.B. 132 (last visited Apr. 12, 2015), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/rr81-177.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/X876-79Y9
(finding that organizations that were not exempt from federal income tax under section
501(c)(3) because the organization failed to file a notice under section 508, might still have
qualified during that period as an organization described in section 501(c)(4)).
222
The Service computer system has in the past not accepted a Form 990 from an
organization that it has not recognized through an application. HILL & MANCINO, supra
note 46, at 32.03. This appears to not be a problem, though, today. I.R.S. Serv. Center
Advice 200046038, at 4 (Sept. 27, 2000), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/0046038.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/2F46-Q25Q.
Service should not reject Form 990s of
organizations that are not required to file applications to be recognized as tax exempt.
223
26 U.S.C. § 527(f) (2012).
224
Id.
225
Id.
226
Id. § 527(j).
227
Donald B. Tobin, Campaign Disclosure and Tax-Exempt Entities: A Quick Repair to the
Regulatory Plumbing, 10 ELECT. L.J. 427, 428 (2011).
228
E.g., Heather K. Gerken, Wade Gibson & Webb Lyons, Rerouting the Flow of ‘Dark
Money’ into Political Campaigns, WASH. POST (Apr. 3, 2014), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/rerouting-the-flow-of-dark-money-intopolitical-campaigns/2014/04/03/1517ac6e-b906-11e3-9a05-c739f29ccb08_story.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/VG7R-JTP7.
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political activity will disqualify a nonprofit from qualifying as a taxexempt social welfare organization. Many of these organizations made
their deep connection to politics by adopting the term party in their
name. Thus, the Service’s interest in the Tea Party organizations’
applications, very explicitly involved in politics, made sense.
IV. POSSIBLE LEGAL BASES FOR PROHIBITING THE USE OF NAMES AS A
SCREENING PROCESS
It is not entirely clear from the IG report why the IG believed that
using names to screen applications violated any legal or ethical norm.
The report suggests that using names could lead to a belief that the
Service was operating in an impartial manner, and also that it could lead
to inconsistent results.229 The IG does not identify a legal violation, but
suggests primarily the violation of an ethical norm.230 The IG cites IRS
Policy Statement 1-1, which provides “IRS employees accomplish this
mission by being impartial and handling tax matters in a manner that
will promote public confidence.”231 To try to examine in greater detail
possible violations of legal or ethical norms in utilizing names, this
Article considers three possible violations the IG might have intended.
First, the IG might have believed the Service simply pulled
organizations by name for closer review without taking into
consideration whether they might have legally deserved a closer review
(“first proposition”). The IG stated that screening should only be based
upon legal requirements rather than upon name or policy position.232
This statement suggests the IG might believe the Service needs some
probable-cause-like standard before subjecting an organization‘s
application to closer scrutiny. Under this view, the Service created
inconsistent taxpayer results by randomly picking names to apply closer
scrutiny. Agents operated much like airport security who randomly
check individuals coming through security. Or, perhaps, the Service
unfairly subjected certain organizations to further scrutiny without
reason to believe these organizations needed more scrutiny. However,
as discussed above, there is no evidence to support this proposition that
the Service choice was entirely random in its selection of these
organizations. Thus, the analysis will focus primarily on the next two
possible claims the IG might be making.

229
230
231
232
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Second, the IG might have believed that pulling applications by
name resulted in unequal enforcement of the law through inconsistent
treatment of organizations applying for exempt status (“second
proposition”). By focusing on organizations by name, the Service may
fail to apply the law to similarly situated organizations that are
potentially violating the Code. Under this theory, the problem with
using the Tea Party name is that it means the Service will enforce the law
in full against all Tea Party organizations, but it may miss some other
similarly situated organizations. Under this theory, the Service should
never use names because it might result in an unequal enforcement of
the law on any application type. This violation assumes, in effect, that
the Service must in the operation of its application system achieve what
Judge Friendly called “the most basic principle of jurisprudence that ‘we
must act alike in all cases of like nature.’”233
Finally, the IG might have meant something similar but narrower.
The IG might have meant that in this particular instance the use of
names was improper because of potential constitutional implications
(“third proposition”). The Service picked conservative organizations by
name to enforce a Code requirement that arguably involved the right to
speak in our political system. The IG might have meant that the use of
names in this instance was particularly harmful because this could lead
to unequal enforcement on an issue that cannot be subject to unequal
enforcement. Namely, this particular enforcement might have violated
the First Amendment of the Constitution by subjecting some
organizations to a different standard because of the content of their
speech.234
The first two propositions implicate sub-Constitutional duties of an
agency, while the third proposition implicates Constitutional duties. In
the former, a court seeking to review such an action would need
authority of a statute to do so. In the latter, the Constitution provides the
court that right.235 This Part will show that the Service can legally and
ethically use names to screen applications. The review validates the
third proposition as the primary limitation on the use of names in
screening applications. Where the Service is enforcing a provision that
implicates a fundamental constitutional right it must exercise greater
care to ensure it is not engaged, nor does it look to be engaged, in some
unequal enforcement of an important right.236

233
234
235
236

Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 758 (1982).
U.S. CONST. amend I.
Id.
IG Report, supra note 2, at 1.
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In considering these propositions, this Section considers legal and
ethical thought that could have a bearing on the Service’s exercise of
discretionary authority in using names to screen its application system.
It is relatively easy to show whether a legal violation occurred or not.
There is little positive law addressing that question. As noted, only
under a very narrow constitutional case can it be shown that the use of
names to screen applications can result in the violation of the law.237 It is
not so easy to determine what should ethically guide the Service.
In developing the ethical case, this Part takes a cue from the
argument of Professor John Rohr that regime values should guide a
bureaucrat in exercising discretion.238 Rohr makes the case that because
bureaucrats are unelected officials, and they are making policy decisions
in their discretionary actions, it is important that bureaucrats be trained
to understand and apply important values of a governmental system.239
He argues these important values are contained in public law.240
Further, he contends that those principles can be found in Supreme
Court opinions and can enrich our understanding of the ethical
obligations of bureaucrats.241 This Article pushes this idea further and
assumes that our laws adopted by Congress and their interpretation by
the courts tell us something significant about regime values and
therefore ethical principles that should guide bureaucrats in exercising
discretion. Thus, although there is neither a positive law, nor an agency
rule, that would deem the use of names to violate law or ethics, we can
extrapolate from general principles derived from these regime values.
This Part also proceeds on the presumption that we grant discretion
to bureaucrats to do justice in some sense. As Professor Davis discussed
in Discretionary Justice, there is a continuum over which we may view
the scope of discretion provided to bureaucrats.242 We may give them
total unfettered discretion or we may determine their every action
through explicit rules. Both poles present problems. Total unfettered
discretion leads to tyranny because the bureaucrat is accountable to
neither law nor political repercussions. However, law that guides every
action prevents individualized justice.243 With rules that are too rigid,
bureaucrats lose the ability to make adjustments where adjustments are
called for.
Id. at 5.
JOHN A. ROHR, ETHICS FOR BUREAUCRATS: AN ESSAY ON LAW AND VALUES 68 (2d ed.
1989).
239
Id. at 2–6.
240
Id. at 73.
241
Id. at 4–5.
242
DAVIS, supra note 6, at 52–54.
243
Cass Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. R. 953, 973 (1995).
237
238
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Discretion is also granted to agencies particularly in the enforcement
arena, because as the Court in Heckler v. Chaney recognized, the agency is
likely the best judge of its limited resources to take enforcement action.244
Given the significant lack of resources in carrying out the EO
determinations function, we should grant the Service significant
discretion in the enforcement decisions it makes. This properly balances
the two often-opposed values of individualized justice and group justice.
Utilizing names as a screening method would appear to fit well within
that discretionary space.
A. What We Can Learn from Courts Reviewing Similar Agency Action
In establishing the base legal and ethical case, this Article starts by
asking the degree of latitude Congress and courts provide to an agency
in carrying out its particular function. We can establish that degree of
latitude by considering the limits of jurisdiction provided to courts and
the standard of review courts use to review that particular agency action.
Those choices tell us something significant about where we as a society
have struck the ethical and legal balance in the operation of a particular
agency function. As discussed in Part II.A.3, Congress grants the Service
substantial space to carry out the collection of revenue. It generally only
grants court’s jurisdiction to review Service action after a taxpayer has
paid a tax, or after the Service has assessed a tax.245 Additionally, the
Anti-Injunction Act generally further prohibits a court from accepting
jurisdiction before final Service action.246 This indicates a high regime
value priority on the collection of revenue. This choice arguably does
not indicate a lack of concern for individualized rights, but it recognizes
that if we focus too intensely on those individualized rights we will
undermine fairness in a global sense.
1.

What Standard of Review Might a Court Use in the Tea Party
Matter?

Courts apply different levels of standard of review to agency action
depending on the category of agency action. Those standards of review
were developed through the common law, but are now generally set by
statute by the Administrative Procedure Act.247 The standard of review
can run from de novo, when there is an explicit law defining agency

244
245
246
247

470 U.S. 821, 827 (1985).
See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing the exemption procedure).
See supra note 102 and accompanying text (discussing the Anti-Injunction Act).
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
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action, to no review at all, as is typical in the case of the question of
whether or not to enforce the law in a particular case.248
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, the Service engages in
informal adjudication when it reviews an application for a
determination.249 A court reviewing factual and policy determinations
made by an agency as part of an order from an informal adjudication
reviews those decisions under the fairly minimal arbitrary and
capricious standard of review.250 As the Supreme Court has stated, a
reviewing court should make a “consideration of the relevant factors and
whether there has been a clear error of judgment. . . . Although this
inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard
of review is a narrow one. The court is not empowered to substitute its
judgment for that of the agency.”251 Thus, courts and Congress believe
agencies should have great leeway in conducting such informal
adjudications. Put another way, courts must generally accept a final
result if it is a plausible result under the law.
The oddity of trying to apply this standard to the Tea Party matter is
that this is a standard that applies to the review of final agency action.252
In the Tea Party matter, almost none of these organizations had yet
received denials of exempt status. But, courts typically look at decisions
made as part of an informal adjudication after the agency has issued an
order, not while administrative process is ongoing.253 A court reviewing
agency action is generally concerned with whether the final answer is
correct.
Given that final action is typically necessary for judicial review,
arguably, as long as the Service utilizes legitimate criteria when
reviewing applications for exemption, its actions should be considered
presumptively lawful. This notion is akin to the Court’s holding in
Heckler v. Chaney. There, the Court established a presumption that an
agency’s decision not to prosecute or enforce is immune from judicial
review as a decision committed to complete agency discretion.254 The
Court noted that great discretion is granted in the case of decisions not to
enforce because an agency has limited resources and has to make

Id.
Steve R. Johnson, Reasoned Explanation and IRS Adjudication, 63 DUKE L.J. 1771, 1779
(2014).
250
§ 706(2)(A).
251
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
252
See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 828 (1985) (providing that the APA calls for
review of final agency action).
253
Id.
254
Id. at 832.
248
249
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judgments about how to best marshal those resources.255 Furthermore,
the activity of enforcement itself has long been considered core executive
power.256 Both of these rationales would appear to apply in a similar
manner to the use of names to screen applications. In effect, the choice to
screen applicants is to make judgments about whom to enforce the law
against. The Court’s holding in Hernandez, discussed in Part IV.A.2.b
below, provides further support for the proposition of a presumption in
favor of the Service in its enforcement choices with respect to reviewing
applications.257
The message contained in court and congressionally-placed limits on
court jurisdiction to review Service action suggests problems with the
first and second propositions. Those propositions seem to significantly
limit the discretion of the Service in carrying out its functions related to
the collection of revenue. That is inconsistent with the approach of
courts and Congress.
2.

What Laws Might Specifically Apply to Prohibit the Use of Names to
Screen Applications

a.

Impermissible Viewpoint Discrimination

A typical complaint against the regime of tax exemption is that it
impermissibly restricts taxpayer’s First Amendment rights to speak. The
Code only provides exemption to certain nonprofits including social
welfare organizations when they give up some of their rights to lobby or
to intervene in a political campaign.258 Despite these claims of
unconstitutionality, the Court has generally found the speech limitations
applicable to tax exempt organizations to be constitutional.259 The Court
has determined that tax exemption is a subsidy and no organization has
a right to subsidized speech.260
Nevertheless, the Service could, through how it administers the law,
violate First Amendment rights. If the Service prohibited the speech of
some but permitted speech to others it would almost certainly violate the
First Amendment.261 “Necessarily, then, under the Equal Protection
Clause, not to mention the First Amendment itself, [the] government
may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds
Id. at 831–32.
Id. at 832.
257
Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 684 (1989).
258
See supra Part II (discussing the legal requirements for social welfare organizations).
259
Regan v. Tax’n with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983); cf. Big Mama Rag, Inc. v.
United States, 631 F.2d 1030, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
260
Id.
261
Police Dept. of City of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
255
256
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acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more
controversial views.”262
There is no doubt that if the Service were to deny exempt status to
organizations with conservative views solely because of those
organizations’ conservative views, it would be acting unconstitutionally.
This First Amendment approach begins to build a case to support the
third proposition.263 It would not support the broader critique, however,
laid out in the first or second propositions.264
b.

Selective Enforcement

A claim of selective enforcement is the most direct legal claim that
can be made against the Service for the use of names in screening
applications. The equal protection and due process clauses as applied to
the federal government through the Fifth Amendment protect against
federal government selective enforcement.265 However, the Court
recognizes that agencies must make enforcement decisions and so sets
the standard high for establishing a claim to selective enforcement.266
“[T]he conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in
itself a federal constitutional violation[,]” there must be a showing that
“the selection was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard
such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.”267
Although selective enforcement is a concept derived from criminal
law, it has been applied in criminal tax and in civil tax audits, as well as
to settlements.268 In Penn-Field Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner, the Tax
Court held, consistent with the principle stated by the Court in Oyler,
that a taxpayer must prove: (1) that other similarly situated taxpayers
were not selected for audit for the same reason; and (2) that this
discriminatory selection was based on race, religion, or based on the
desire to prevent constitutional rights.269
Id.
See supra note 261 and accompanying text (providing a discussion on the First
Amendment approach).
264
See supra notes 232–34 and accompanying text (considering the possible violations the
IG might have intended).
265
See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498 (1954) (exemplifying that the equal
protection clause and due process clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibit racial
segregation of school in the District of Columbia).
266
Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962).
267
Id.
268
See Steve R. Johnson, The Selective Enforcement Defense in Civil and Criminal Tax Cases,
27 A.B.A. SECTION OF TAX’N NEWS QUARTERLY 14 (Winter 2008) (discussing the scope of
selective enforcement in criminal tax and civil tax audits).
269
74 T.C. 720, 723 (1980); see An IRS Duty of Consistency, supra note 11, at 590 (discussing
the two-prong test); The Selective Enforcement Defense in Civil and Criminal Tax Cases, supra
262
263
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Courts have evaluated a few selective enforcement cases associated
with the charitable contribution deduction.
Those decisions are
instructive in how a court might view this Tea Party matter. In
Hernandez v. Commissioner, for instance, the Service denied charitable
contribution deductions claimed by Scientology adherents.270 The
Scientologists claimed that the Service selectively enforced a limitation
on charitable contributions against those who practiced the Scientology
The Court
religion but not against other religious adherents.271
acknowledged that the lower courts found no showing of “the type of
hostility to a target of law enforcement that would support a claim of
selective enforcement.”272 The Court also rejected the Scientologists’
arguments that they should be able to deduct payments for religious
activities because other faiths got to do the same.273 The Court found
first that the merits of deductions by other religious adherents were not
Secondly, the Court determined that the
before the Court.274
Scientologists’ requested deductions simply did not meet the
requirements of the law to be entitled to a charitable contribution
deduction, the Court dismissed the assertion.275 Without a showing of
some animus and with an understanding that the Service appeared to be
applying a reasonable interpretation of the law, the Court saw no claim
for selective enforcement.276
The selective enforcement analysis simply does not support a case
that using names as a screening tool is prima facie problematic. We
again see courts provide the Service substantial discretion in carrying out
its enforcement activities. Selective enforcement applies only when: (1)
an agency does not apply similar treatment to similar organizations; and
note 268, at 14 (discussing the support needed to defend a claim of selective or
discriminatory prosecution).
270
490 U.S. 680, 686 (1989).
271
Id.
272
Id. at 700 (citing Graham v. Comm’r, 822 F.2d 844, 853 (9th Cir. 1987)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
273
Id. at 698.
274
Id. at 699.
275
Id.
276
Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 699. Admittedly, some courts have found that the Service
inconsistently applies the law to different religious groups. Shortly after Hernandez, the
Eleventh Circuit found in another Scientology case that the Service may have acted in an
administratively inconsistent manner on an issue of religion. Powell v. United States, 945
F.2d 374, 377–78 (11th Cir. 1991). The Court in Powell found that the plaintiff was due a
hearing as to whether this violated the plaintiff’s important constitutional rights. Id. at 377;
see Sklar v. Comm’r, 282 F.3d 610, 612 (9th Cir. 2002) (determining the Service policy to
allow deductions to Scientologists but not to other religions discriminatory and had no
justification, but the Sklar family lost anyway because the tuition payment was not
deductible).
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(2) a constitutional right is at stake. In most contexts, neither prong will
hold true. The Service is not likely enforcing the law in a selective
manner, and maybe more importantly for this analysis, it is unlikely that
constitutional rights are at stake in most attempts to enforce the Code.
However, where the Service is applying a law that implicates a
Constitutional right, such as freedom of speech or free exercise of
religion, as was arguably the case in the Tea Party matter, greater care is
called for. This suggests a regime value that from an ethical standpoint
should guide the Service in administering its application system.
There are legitimate reasons the Service might choose to screen
organizations based on name. An attempt to achieve uniformity of result
is a legitimate reason to screen on the basis of name.
Where
organizations connected are complex, or present complex or challenging
questions to the Service, the use of names to ensure evenhanded
enforcement with respect to those organizations seems axiomatic.
Additionally, the use of a name to identify replicated organizations that
the Service has reason to believe are violating a Code section should also
provide a legitimate basis for screening on the basis of name. The key
for the Service for properly using names under selective enforcement
guidance would be to first ask whether a particular Code section in the
way it is being enforced implicates a Constitutional right. If it does, then
the Service should work to establish a record of uniform treatment to all
organizations subject to enforcement under that particular Code
section.277 This Section most directly undermines any support for the
first or second proposition and supports in full the third.
c.

Duty of Consistency

This Section considers an only tangentially related subject.
However, it is important because it seems likely that this theory
underlies the IG’s concern regarding the manner of screening in the Tea
Party cases. Some courts have found that the Service has a duty of
consistency.278 The duty of consistency is based on Justice Frankfurter’s
announced principle that the “Commissioner cannot tax one and not tax
another without some rational basis for the difference.”279 This theory is
closely related to the selective enforcement cases above; however, under

277
This approach could present significant resource challenges too—as the Service comes
upon such enforcement challenges, it should reconsider its approach to the issue.
278
See, e.g., United States v. Kaiser, 363 U.S. 299, 308 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(referring to Justice Frankfurter’s concurring opinion, where he discusses equal tax
treatment).
279
Id.
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this version, there is no need for a constitutional right to be at stake.280
Thus, were we to extend this theory to the question of the Service using
names to screen applications, we might be able to support the second
proposition, and maybe even the first.
In the classic duty of consistency case, the Service issued a private
letter ruling to Remington stating that Remington did not owe tax on the
sale of certain machines.281 IBM asked for the same ruling because it sold
the same type of machines, but the Service denied IBM’s request.282 The
Claims Court determined that it could review the decision of the Service
for an abuse of discretion.283 Finding that "[e]quality of treatment is so
dominant in our understanding of justice that discretion, where it is
allowed a role, must pay the strictest heed," the Court held that the
Service abused its discretion by not treating IBM in the same way it
treated Remington.284
This case has not been widely followed. Congress and courts
recognize the Herculean task that maintaining absolute consistency
would mean given the available Service resources.285 For instance, Judge
Friendly has stated, “[w]hile even-handed treatment should be the
Commissioner's goal, perfection in the administration of such vast
responsibilities cannot be expected. The making of an error in one case,
if error it was, gives other taxpayers no right to its perpetuation.”286
Furthermore, as the Claims Court held in a case soon after the IBM
matter:
It is a settled principle of law that the United States is
not bound by the unauthorized acts of it agents, that it is
not estopped to assert the lack of authority as a defense,
and that persons dealing with an agent of the

280
See Richard A. Epstein, What Do We Mean by the Rule of Law?, N.Z. BUS. ROUNDTABLE,
Aug. 2005, at 2–3 (stating that similarly situated individuals should be treated similarly,
avoiding arbitrary and capricious decisions).
281
Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp. v. United States, 343 F.2d 914, 924–25 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
282
Id. at 929.
283
Id. at 920.
284
Id.
285
See, e.g., Sirbo Holdings, Inc. v. Comm’r, 509 F.2d 1220, 1222 (2d Cir. 1975) (discussing
the near impossibility of absolute consistency).
286
Id. (citations omitted); see Wagner v. United States, 387 F.2d 966, 968 (providing that
the Commissioner may change a former practice if he believes it is wrong); Snowden v.
Hughes, 320 U.S 1, 15 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“The Constitution does not
assure uniformity of decisions or immunity from merely erroneous action, whether by the
courts or the executive agencies of a state.”).
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government must take notice of the limitations of his
authority.287
Scholars recognize that courts apply the duty of consistency
inconsistently. As pointed out by Professor Johnson, most cases limit the
IBM and Remington precedent to situations where two conditions are
present: (1) two taxpayers are in competition; and (2) the taxpayer
denied a favorable ruling claims the Commissioner abused his discretion
by failing to apply a new legal position only prospectively.288 Professor
Johnson refers to three principal duty of consistency views: (1) a “strong
duty”; (2) “no duty”; and (3) a “weak duty.”289 Under the strong duty
view, even if the Service position being asserted is the correct state of the
law, a court will find for the taxpayer if the Service practice has been
contrary to the state of the law and favorable to the taxpayer.290 Under
the no duty view, while there may be some moral or ethical compulsion
that the Service treat taxpayers similarly, such a duty is not judicially
enforceable.291 Finally, under the weak duty views, courts either believe
that the duty only applies under certain circumstances, or the remedy
does not necessarily mean the taxpayer wins.292
What is important, however, is to distinguish consistency of result
from consistency of process. The case law and Professor Johnson’s
scholarship concerns the former and not the latter. First, given the level
of discretionary authority the Service has in the area of enforcing
exemption, under even the weak level of duty of consistency, the Service
probably has a duty to treat taxpayers as similarly as possible. It should
make every effort to apply the law consistently to inspire taxpayer
confidence in the impartiality of the Service. However, the duty of
consistency has nothing to say about enforcement discretion of the
Service.
Second, a duty of consistency applies only in situations where the
Service provides a final positive decision to one group and denies it to
another. The use of names in screening organizations does not do this.
Bornstein v. United States, 345 F.2d 558, 562 (Ct. C1. 1965).
See The Selective Enforcement of Defense in Civil and Criminal Tax Cases, supra note 268, at
578 (citing Vons Cos. v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 1, 10 (2001)) (noting the two limited
conditions where the IBM and Remington precedent are applicable).
289
Id. at 580.
290
See, e.g., Vesco v. Comm’r, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 101, 129 (1979) (holding that even though
the state of the law meant that the value of flights of family members should be included in
income, because the Service had a practice of not treating this as income, the court rejected
the Service’s position in the case).
291
The Selective Enforcement of Defense in Civil and Criminal Tax Cases, supra note 268, at
583.
292
Id. at 584.
287
288
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Using names to screen for organizations does not implicate the question
of whether the Service is applying the same precedent. The duty of
consistency puts a premium on consistency of result. Arguably, if the
Service does not utilize names as a means of screening applicants that
are related, it likely increases inconsistency of result within that group of
organizations. If it does use names, however, it may at times treat the
named organization differently than it treats non-named organizations,
but only in process, not in result. As a result of Service resources, there
is likely to be a lack of consistency of process treatment no matter what
direction the Service takes. Arguably, however, that the use of names
should ultimately result in greater consistency of result, which is what
should be the concern. By increasing the expertise of its staff with
particular organizations and issues, the Service should be pushing closer
to the underlying goal of all of the duty of consistency cases—the fair
treatment of taxpayers by a consistent application of the law. Thus,
support for only the third proposition is to be found in the duty of
consistency line of thought.
3.

Other Considerations

The following topics are tangential considerations regarding
employee discretion and the use of names for screening that help to
further the support for the third proposition.293 These also are items that
need to at least be considered as relevant to the Tea Party matter.
a.

Application of 1998 Restructuring Act Principles

Congress has significantly restructured the Service four times.294 The
complaints that the Service can never shake are that it is secretive,
inefficient, and mistreats taxpayers.295 All three complaints are found in
the Tea Party matter.
These complaints also inspired the last
restructuring of the Service, and, thus, it is important to at least consider
the impact that the restructuring should have had on the way the Service
operated in this instance.296
In the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of
1998 (“Reform Act”), Congress restructured the Service to remedy what

293
See infra Part IV.A.3.a–b (applying the 1998 Restructuring Act principles and
analyzing unnecessary examinations).
294
Thorndike, supra note 11, at 718.
295
Id.
296
See infra notes 297–300 and accompanying text (explaining the Reform Act of 1998).
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it saw as employee abuses of taxpayers.297 The Reform Act broadly
worked to change Service organization and management, mode of
Congressional oversight, electronic filing, and most important for this
part, created new taxpayer protections and rights.298 Of importance to
the consideration of this Article, the Act created what are often referred
to as the Ten Deadly Sins of a Service employee.299 These sins result in
automatic termination of an employee.300 Thus, are any of the Ten
Deadly Sins applicable to the case of a Service employee screening
applications?
The sins most likely implicated include three, six, and ten. Deadly
Sin Three prohibits “with respect to a taxpayer, taxpayer representative,
or other employee of the Internal Revenue Service, the violation of (A)
any constitutional right or (B) any civil right established under certain
specified statutes, such as the Civil Rights Acts.”301 Deadly Sin Six
involves the willful violation of the Code or regulations or Service
policies to retaliate or harass a taxpayer.302 Finally, Deadly Sin Ten
prohibits the threat of an audit to extract political gain or benefit.303
There is nothing in the use of names to screen applications that
would suggest a prima facie violation of any of the Deadly Sins.
Screening could rise to that level, but again, there would need to be some
animus in the decision of the Service to use the names for some ulterior
motives. In the vast majority of cases, it seems unlikely that Service
employees would use names in this manner. Nevertheless, in using
names in the screening process, the Service may want to impose some
checks to ensure that the names are not being used for improper
purposes. The IG made what is probably a good suggestion in its report
that the BOLO listing should be approved at a higher level than in the
Cincinnati office.304

297
Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (1998); see, e.g., Thorndike, supra note 11, at 765
(stating that Congress reformed the IRS in 1998).
298
JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, REPORT OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N RELATING TO THE IRS
AS REQUIRED BY THE IRS REFORM AND RESTRUCTURING ACT OF 1998, 1 (May 4, 2001),
available at http://www.jct.gov/x-33-01.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/6X78-5X8Z.
299
Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 26 U.S.C. § 7804
(2012).
300
Id. § 7804(b)(3).
301
Id. § 7804(b)(6).
302
Id.
303
Id. § 7804(b)(10).
304
IG Report, supra note 2, at 10.
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Unnecessary Examinations

Section 7605(b) prohibits the Commissioner from conducting
The rule regarding unnecessary
unnecessary examinations.305
examinations does not apply to the determinations function because the
latter is not an examination.306 It seems reasonable to conclude, however,
that the law regarding unnecessary examinations could at least be
ethically instructive to Service agents managing the determinations
process. What we find again is strong support for the third proposition.
The leading case on section 7605(b) is United States v. Powell, where
the Court held that the idea of necessity within section 7605(b) did not
contemplate a showing of probable cause to conduct an examination for
fraud.307 The Court considered the history of the statute and concluded
that, while Congress enacted it to ensure that the Service needed to
conduct an examination, it did not intend to import a particularly high
burden for the Commissioner.308 The Court’s discussion of that history is
instructive:
Congress recognized a need for a curb on the
investigating powers of low-echelon revenue agents,
and considered that it met this need simply and fully by
requiring such agents to clear any repetitive examination
with a superior. For us to import a probable cause
standard to be enforced by the courts would
substantially overshoot the goal which the legislators
sought to attain. There is no intimation in the legislative
history that Congress intended the courts to oversee the
Commissioner's determinations to investigate.309
The Court’s guidance in Powell is that the Service should have
substantial latitude in determining what and how much to examine.310 It
seems reasonable to believe that in the determinations process, such
latitude should be granted as well. In that case, it seems perfectly
acceptable to believe that the Service could use names to screen
applications in ways mentioned above: (1) to achieve uniformity; or (2)
where there is concern that a particular name may be associated with

305
306
307
308
309
310

§ 7605(b).
JOHN A. TOWNSEND, FEDERAL TAX PROCEDURE 256 (2d ed. 2013).
United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 51 (1964).
Id. at 53–54.
Id. at 55–56.
Id.
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violations of the Code. Thus, again this provides no support for any of
the propositions beside the third proposition.
V. APPLICATION OF ANALYSIS TO THE TEA PARTY SITUATION
A. The Legal and Ethical Case
This final Part considers how the above principles should apply to
the actual Tea Party matter. Unlike the IG Report, this Part takes into
consideration the management of Service resources. In the Tea Party
matter, the Service made a decision about its resources and the law it
enforces.311 As established in Part II, Service resources are scarce and the
Service has to make judgments regarding which applications to provide
a closer review.312 Additionally, the agency has individuals with the
unique knowledge of the organization and its goals that place the agency
in the best position to make these calls.
As the analysis in Part IV demonstrated, the primary theory that is
potentially applicable to the Tea Party matter is a theory of selective
enforcement.313 A first observation is that the Service made no final
determinations regarding the Tea Party organizations. The selective
enforcement theme is used to attack a final negative determination
generally, not typically an ongoing investigation. Thus, a question of
selective enforcement does not have great application to these cases
unless the Service should deny the Tea Party organizations while
granting such status to similarly situated liberal organizations. While
procedure on the margins is important, there should be a presumption of
legitimate process where the Service gets to the right result.
If the Service issued denials in the Tea Party matter it would still be
hard for a plaintiff to mount a successful selective enforcement case. The
first step calls for a conclusion that the Service did not treat other
organizations in a similar manner. Here, the fact that only about one
third of the organizations identified in the audit were conservative
organizations makes it difficult to get past the first step of the United
States Tax Court’s Penn-Field test for selective enforcement.314
Additionally, the evidence is that the Service in a similar time period
selected for review and issued denials to a Democratic women’s
311
See supra note 244 and accompanying text (discussing Heckler’s proposition that the
Service is the best judge of its limited resources).
312
See supra Part II (providing information on the responsibilities and resources of the
Service for the determinations process).
313
See supra Part IV (analyzing the legal bases for the issues with the determinations
process).
314
See supra note 269 and accompanying text (providing the test from Penn-Field).
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organization.315 Thus, on the basis of the evidence before the public,
there is no evidence that the Service is applying the law in its final
determinations in an inconsistent manner.
As for the second step, the requirements of section 501(c)(4) prohibit
some political activity.316 Thus, a case can be made that its enforcement
at least implicates a constitutional right—the right to free speech and free
association. However, nothing in the determination process stops an
organization from speaking. The Service is only trying to determine a
tax status and imposes no restrictions on speech. The only question is
whether the organization is taxable or tax-exempt. Organizations
willingly submit applications to the Service to be recognized as
organizations exempt from income tax. Further, as the Court has
recognized, there is no right to exemption from income tax.317 Thus,
while these cases touched on a constitutional right, the contention that
these cases specifically impacted a constitutional right is weak. Thus, a
legal case that the Service might have selectively enforced the law
against the Tea Party groups is weak.
However, as established in Part III, US regime values suggest a
strong ethical obligation on the part of Service employees to act with a
high standard of care on a case that implicates a constitutional right.318
Although the standard for a legal claim to selective enforcement should
likely be higher, given the universal immediate response to the idea that
the Service targeted the Tea Party, it seems reasonable to conclude that
this is a sufficient enough connection to a constitutional right for ethical
purposes. There is ample evidence that the Service did not operate with
a high degree of care as it managed the Tea Party cases. While the
Service appears to have put some significant amount of resources to
work on these cases, the Service employees tended to manage them
sloppily. There was a lack of clarity in instruction from management,
and a tendency to forget about cases and take far too long in coming to a
See Stephanie Strom, 3 Groups Denied Breaks by the IRS are Named, N.Y. TIMES (July 20,
2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/21/business/advocacy-groupsdenied-tax-exempt-status-are-named.html, archived at http://perma.cc/NG2R-TMTS
(detailing the story of the denial of social welfare organization status to three Democratic
women’s organizations); Joan Walsh, Meet the Group the IRS Actually Denied: Democrats!,
SALON (May 15, 2013), available at http://www.salon.com/2013/05/15/meet_the_group_
the_irs_actually_revoked_democrats/, archived at http://perma.cc/8BC5-T2LF (detailing
how the Service systematically denied and pulled exemptions from this Democratic
women’s group seeking status as social welfare organizations).
316
26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4) (2012).
317
See supra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing the process an organization must
follow to be granted an exemption).
318
See supra Part III (discussing the ethical obligations of Service employees and the
higher standard of care expected of them).
315
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decision. Additionally, the questions asked were at times overly
intrusive. Furthermore, the Service sloppily managed a record of its
efforts to manage liberal and conservative organizations with equal care.
The Service should establish a record of care of enforcement when
managing cases associated with political activity to reestablish integrity
in the determinations process. The Service could consider implementing
this into its procedures in the IRM or in an annual revenue procedure.
Additionally, the Service might consider adding to its annual training a
discussion of ethics from a Constitutional perspective, rather than from
the very rule based method it annually utilizes.
This analysis leaves a few questions for the Service to consider as it
manages its Determinations Process. First, when the Service is screening
for political advocacy organizations in its computer system, should it be
forced to utilize a roughly “equal” number of tag-words referring to
conservative and liberal organizations? My sense is that this would be a
good practice on the part of the Service. This could help establish a
record of evenhandedness.
Second, what if there is good reason to think that conservative
organizations are making use of an organizational structure much more
than liberal organizations—may the Service be permitted to focus more
on conservative tag-words provided that it offers a sufficient justification
for that choice? This is really related to the first question. Perhaps it
should be phrased as, if it appears the Service is enforcing the law in
greater number against conservative organizations, as was the apparent
appearance in the Tea Party matter, is there a way for the Service to
insulate itself from claims of selective enforcement. It seems the high
degree of care would mandate what was stated as to the first question—
that is, the Service should make strong efforts to ensure it maintains a list
of all organizations from all political persuasions to ensure it is picking
up the widest diversity of political organization possible.
Finally, should different constitutional standards give rise to
different standards of justifications? In other words, does the Service
have more leeway to target, say, a subset of religious organizations as
opposed to a subset of political organizations, or race-based
organizations? Given that the premise of this Article is that the standard
of care for regular enforcement is one standard and the standard for
enforcement when impinging on a constitutional right is higher, it stands
to reason that the Service should apply different standards depending on
the constitutional right involved. It probably should never screen on
race-based standards. However, fortunately, and correctly, there are no
race-based standards for qualifying for tax-exemption. Interestingly in
the realm of religion, Congress has already provided significant
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protections to churches.319 Congress believes churches at least should be
provided some extra protection from the Service.
B. Recommendations Regarding the IG Based on This Analysis
The IG, a creature of the 1998 Tax Restructuring Act, fills an
important role. It helps provide critical analysis of Service functions. It
is an important independent voice that can protect taxpayers from
improper Service action, and can provide the Service a picture of
problems that the organization is facing. However, in exercising this
role, the IG needs to be more careful in anchoring its claims of violations
by the Service in its proper legal, ethical, and policy context. The report
on the Tea Party failed to anchor a major claim in anything more than a
Service platitude. It also badly advised the Service in future action.
Failing to use names in screening applications will lead to less
consistency by the Service rather than more. The IG simply failed to
consider all of the factors that needed to be balanced in issuing its report.
VI. CONCLUSION
What mandate does Congress and constitutional law set for the
Service in operating the EO determinations process? Arguably, it is to as
quickly as reasonably possible correctly assess the applications it
receives for exemption. The IG Report raises the question of what
methods are appropriate to accomplish this function. What could guide
the Service in this question? The IG suggests that it must use the
standards from the Code and regulations in making screening decisions.
However, given the Service’s limited resources and heavy workload, this
seems more likely to result in greater harm to uniformity and fairness of
treatment than the system that the Service appears to have been utilizing.
Eliminating a simple tool of allowing related organizations to be easily
identified by name and considered together by the same agents seems
more likely to result in non-uniform results.
This review of authorities overwhelmingly suggests that both
Congress and courts believe a high degree of discretion should be
granted to the Service as it collects revenue. Tax exemption directly
implicates the collection of revenue since each organization granted
exempt status is freed from having to contribute coin to the general
welfare of the United States. Determination of exempt status is a
necessary part of the system of revenue collection. In carrying out that

See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 7611 (2012) (restricting tax inquiries and examinations on
churches).
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function, the Service certainly has a duty to enforce the laws as
impartially as possible. The use of names to screen applications in most
instances should not suggest that the Service is acting impartially. The
lesson of the Tea Party matter though is that in the case of political
activity, the use of names may cause some to question the partiality of
Service employees. This is not inconsistent with the way courts view
selective enforcement. Where enforcement touches on a constitutional
right, courts are more likely to find impermissible enforcement actions.
This suggests that where the Service is enforcing a provision, such as the
prohibition on too much political campaign activity, that the Service
should establish a record that utilizing a name will result in more fair
enforcement than not using a name. Additionally, it should ensure that
it is making every effort to utilize names widely within that field of
enforcement. Finally, while the Service engaged in no legal violation in
utilizing names to screen the applications, its bumbling management of
the application of a law that touches on important constitutional rights
failed to meet ethical standards.
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